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States and in France
Charlotte J. Romano*
I. INTRODUCTION
Comparative advertising has been widely used for over thirty years in
the United States. By contrast, the use of this advertising format has
traditionally been-and still is-very marginal in France. Thus, when a
commercial comparing the composition of two brands of mashed potatoes
was broadcast on French national television in February 2003, several TV
viewers, believing this type of advertisement to be prohibited, notified the
French authority responsible for controlling television information
broadcasts.' A comparison of available comparative advertising statistics
provides a relevant illustration of the contrast between the two countries.
About 80% of all television advertisements, 2 and 30% to 40% of all
advertisements, contained comparative claims in the United States in the
early 1990's.3 Conversely, only twenty-six advertisements were considered
to be a form of comparative advertising in France in 1992 and 1993. 4
* The author received a Masters Degree in Trade Regulation from New York University
School of Law in 2003 and a D.E.S.S. in Intellectual Property Law from Paris II Panth6on-
Assas University in 1999. She is a member of the New York Bar and is currently working in
London with the law firm Wragge & Co. LLP. The author is most grateful to Professor
Rebecca Tushnet from the New York University School of Law Faculty for her support and
encouragement to publish this article and for providing feedback on the draft version of this
article.
1 Conseil Supdrieur de l'Audiovisuel, Comment se fait-il que 'on voit apparaftre des
messages de publicit comparative 6 la t~l~vision?, available at http://www.csa.fr/outils/faq/
faq.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2005).
2 Thomas E. Barry, Comparative Advertising: What Have We Learnt in Two Decades?,
33(2) J. ADVERT. REs. 19, 20 (1993); Roslyn S. Harrison, The Law of Comparative
Advertising in the United States and Abroad, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 1995:
MANAGEMENT & PROTECTION 218 (Siegrun D. Kane & Mark A. Steiner, eds., 1995).
3 Naveen Donthu, A Cross-Country Investigation of Recall of and Attitude Toward
Comparative Advertising, 27(2) J. ADVERT. 111, 111 (1998).
4 See Direction G~n~rale de la Consommation, de la Concurrence et de la Repression des
Fraudes (DGCCRF), Rapport relatif a l'exercice de lapublicitj comparative, (May 1994).
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Although one might assume that a lot of ink has been spilled over such a
striking contrast, few commentators have devoted themselves to a
comparative analysis of the two legal regimes.
The term "comparative advertising" refers to any form of advertising
in which a trademark owner draws a comparison between his product,
service, or brand and that of a competitor. Comparative claims are variable
in nature. They may explicitly name a competitor or implicitly refer to him.
They may emphasize the similarities (positive comparisons) or the
differences (negative comparisons) between the products. They may state
that the advertised product is "better than" (superiority claims) or "as good
as" the competitor's (equivalence or parity claims).
The issue of the legality of comparative advertising has given rise to
numerous debates and discussions on both sides of the Atlantic. 5  The
reason lies in the fact that "[t]ypically, comparative advertisements contain
more-or at least apparently more-information than 'normal'
advertisements.., and the possible abuse of or benefit to the consuming
public is greater.'6 In addition, consumers seem to accord greater
importance to comparative claims than to non-comparative ones.7
Legislative authorities, courts, administrative agencies, researchers, and
consumers' representatives often deal with the same straightforward
question: to what extent should comparative advertising be authorized or
limited?
The answer requires an articulation of the conflicting interests of the
parties involved in comparative advertising:8 the advertiser, the competitor
subject to the comparison, and the consumer. Most significant is the
conflict between the advertiser and the competitor. 9 On the one hand, the
advertiser's objective is to inform the public about the qualities of his
products or services in a way that makes consumers more likely to buy
them. He wants to be free to use comparative advertising whenever it
appears to be the most effective advertising strategy.' 0 On the other hand,
the competitor is concerned not only with decreasing the number of ways
5 See, e.g., Andr6 Bertrand, Peut-on vraiment l9galiser la publicit comparative?, 38
REVUE DU DROIT DE LA PROPRItT INTELLECTUELLE 23 (1991); Monique Luby, Propos
critiques sur la lgalisation de la publicitg comparative, D. 1993 chron. 53; Stephen Nye, In
Defense of Truthful Comparative Advertising, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 351 (1977); Albert Robin
& Howard B. Barnaby, Jr., Comparative Advertising: A Skeptical View, 67 TRADEMARK REP.
358 (1977).
6 Stewart E. Sterck, The Law of Comparative Advertising: How Much Worse Is "Better"
than "Great, " 76 COLUM. L. REV. 80, 80-81 (1976) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 81 n.6.
8 Theo Bodewig, The Regulation of Comparative Advertising in the European Union, 9
TuL. EUR. & Cv. L.F. 179, 187 (1994).
9 Id. at 188.
'o Id. at 185-86.
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his rivals can describe their products or attract consumer attention, but also
with protecting his reputation and goodwill as well as the fairness of
commercial practices. He wants to impede his rivals from criticizing his
trademarks or goods, or from using them as a standard which they claim to
also meet. The competitor, therefore, has a clear interest in the prohibition
of comparative advertising. At the very least, he wants to be able to prevent
his competitors from making false or misleading statements about his
offered products or services. 1 For the sake of clarity, it must be noted that
the competitor is also sometimes the advertiser (and vice versa) and so each
has a dual interest. When it comes to comparative advertising, however, the
established competitor, or the one with the strongest market position, has a
greater interest in the prohibition of this marketing tool as he is more likely
to be used as a benchmark by other producers in the market. Between those
conflicting interests stands the interest of the consumer who desires to be
accurately informed about the features of the goods or services available on
the market.1
2
There is a close interdependent relationship between the above
particular interests. Traditionally, the objective pursued in each country
with respect to competition serves as a guideline in determining the
individual weighting of each of them: if the objective is to protect each
individual competitor against his rivals' aggressive business practices and
to promote competitor welfare, the trend will be to limit comparative
advertising. On the contrary, if it is to stimulate the competitive process by
promoting free competition and to improve consumer welfare in the
marketplace, 3 emphasis shall be focused on the interest of the advertiser.
Today, both the United States and France wish to stimulate free competition
and consumer welfare. 4 As a result, both countries' policies encourage
" Id. at 187.
12 Id. at 188.
13 The policy goals of competition and consumer welfare are closely connected. See, e.g.,
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993) (stating "'[a]nticompetitive' has a
special meaning: it refers not to actions that merely injure individual competitors, but rather
to actions that harm the competitive process, a process that aims to bring consumers the
benefits of lower prices, better products, and more efficient production methods."); Interface
Group v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding "[t]he policy of
competition is designed for the ultimate benefit of consumers rather than of individual
competitors, and a consumer has no interest in the preservation of a fixed number of
competitors greater than the number required to assure his being able to buy at the
competitive price.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also JEAN CALAIS-AULOY &
FRANCK STEINMETZ, DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION 15 16 (Dalloz, 4th ed. 1996) (asserting
that the rules prohibiting aggressive business practices belong to both the consumer law area
and the competition law field and that, more generally, almost all competition law rules have
consequences which may affect consumers and vice versa).
14 In the United States, the right to compete is regarded as the "fundamental premise of
the free enterprise system." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995).
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comparative advertising.
The central issue of this article is to determine why, despite these
identical guiding policies, comparative advertising remains unusual in
France while it is commonplace in the United States. Attempting to answer
that question unavoidably raises numerous related issues: can the two
regimes be different and nevertheless equally meet the shared objectives of
free competition and consumer welfare? Which other policies, values, and
standards, if any, clash with the policy in favor of comparative advertising?
Is one country's regime better than the other?
Part II describes and analyzes the development of the policy in favor of
comparative advertising in both countries. It explores U.S. and French laws
of comparative advertising and explains that one same principle-the
authorization of truthful and non-confusing comparative advertising-
prevails in the two countries as a result of this shared policy. Part III
contends that the French legal boundaries to comparative advertising are
tighter than those in the United States. It analyzes the justifications for the
existence of such limitations in France, as opposed to those underlying the
absence of such limitations in the United States. Part IV concludes that the
U.S. comparative advertising legal regime is in every respect more
persuasive than the French regime.
II. A SHARED PRINCIPLE RESTING ON A SHARED POLICY
The policy favoring comparative advertising is based on the premise
that comparative advertising-insofar as it is true and does not create
confusion in the public's mind as to the source of the goods or services
marketed-promotes free competition and consumer welfare. It is therefore
not surprising that the basic principle of the law of comparative advertising
today in both countries authorizes truthful and non-confusing comparisons.
Courts often state that the main purpose of antitrust law is to promote free competition. See,
e.g., Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (holding that the sole aim of
antitrust legislation is to protect competition); Natrona Serv., Inc., v. Cont'l Oil Co., 598
F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1979) (declaring that antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of
competition, not for the protection of competitors); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:1 (West Group, 4th ed. 2003) (citation and
footnotes omitted). In France, the principle of freedom that governs business life has its roots
in the so-called 1791 "loi d'Allarde." See Ordonnance no. 86-1243 du ler dcembre 1986
relative 6 la libert6 des prix et de la concurrence, art. 1 [Decree No. 86-1243 of Dec. 1 1986
Concerning Freedom of Prices and Competition] (establishing the principle of competition),
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/ADFAR.htm (last visited Jan. 6,
2005). European law has also made the principle of competition an obligation that compels
Member States. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
4(1), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ECconsol.pdf.
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A. Comparative Advertising: A Means of Improving Consumer Welfare
and Stimulating Free Competition
It is a generally accepted fact that the cost paid by consumers when
buying a product has two components: the price of the good and the so-
called "consumer search cost" resulting from the time, energy, efforts, and
amount of money incurred before the purchase in order to gather price and
quality information about the product.' As Professor McCarthy points out:
If the consumer knows quite a bit about brand A ... and relatively little
about brand Z, then purchasing brand Z will appear to be a risky choice.
"The ideal solution in such a case would be to somehow make
consumers fully informed, so that they knew as much about the second
brand as about the first. The problem is that such process costs money. It
takes time and effort for consumers to acquire information about the
other brands for themselves, and they may rationally value the benefits
of fmdinS a lower-priced equivalent brand less that the effort required to
find it."
Collecting information about the product may involve, for example,
visiting stores, which generates time and transportation costs, making
telephone calls, and buying magazines. 17 In such a context, comparative
advertising is regarded as a cost-effective means of informing the buying
public of the similarity or superiority of the features of one particular good
to those of competitive products. 18 Given the wide diversity of goods and
services available today, comparative advertising assists consumers in
making choices among products by providing them with a basis for
evaluating the merits of similar products.
By providing information to consumers, comparative advertising is
deemed to facilitate competition. Entering the market is a tough challenge
15 See Sherman Hanna, The Economics of Information, at http://www.hec.osu.edu/
people/shanna/741/stigler.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2005); see also ANDREW B. WHrNSTON ET
AL., THE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 256 (Macmillan Technical Publishing
1997).
16 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:5 (quoting F.T.C. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING,
F.T.C. POLICY PLANNING ISSUES PAPER: TRADEMARKS, CONSUMER INFORMATION AND
BARRIERS TO COMPETITION 22 (1979) (The Craswell Report)).
17 See WHINSTON ET AL., supra note 15, at 256.
18 See, e.g., 4 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 25:52 (stating "[c]omparative advertising...
is 'highly beneficial to consumers' and may convey to them valuable information") (quoting
August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, (7th Cir. 1995)); Lee Goldman, The
World's Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Advertising, 45 FLA. L. REv. 487, 491-92
(stating "[i]nformal advertising increases buyer knowledge about the price, quality and
benefits of various products, thus reducing consumers' search cost and the total costs to
consumers of transacting business. Truthful advertising not only produces lower effective
prices, but induces sellers to improve the quality of their goods.").
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for a newcomer. He has to expend great efforts, skills, and large sums of
money to develop the reputation of his products, services or brands through
costly and extensive advertising campaigns. In this context, comparative
advertising is considered a strategy to reduce market entry barriers; it
provides consumers with a convenient benchmark for the new product so
that the new entrant only has to advertise the special features of his product,
as opposed to the characteristics it shares with comparable goods already on
the market.
However, only truthful and non-confusing comparative advertising
contributes to consumer welfare and free competition in the marketplace.
The idea that false advertising affects the "quality of decisionmaking" 19 is
universally accepted.2° It is deemed to "increase[] uncertainty and impede[]
informed decision-making. It is highly correlated with consumers'
dissatisfaction and disappointment." 2' Confusing comparative advertising
impairs the primary purpose of the trademark, which is to provide a means
for consumers to distinguish one manufacturer's products from those of
another.22 Yet, this purpose needs to be preserved to ensure consumer
welfare and competition in the marketplace. This argument was articulated
by the Ninth Circuit in the leading Chanel case:
23
19 Lilian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 1, 14 (1992). It should be
pointed out that U.S. law distinguishes different kinds of falsity. First, false express claims
are stated literally in the advertisement. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc. v.
Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 516 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding an ad literally false
where it incorporates the pictures of two identical gas pumps and two identical airline tickets
with different prices, together with the slogan "Which one would you choose?," because the
ad claims that, like the pumps or the tickets, the advertised drug is equivalent to, but cheaper
than, the competitor's drug). Second, a claim may also be false by necessary implication
when the claim that is necessarily implied by the ad makes it false on its face. See, e.g.,
Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 941, 946 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding a comparison
by necessary implication where the advertised motor oil was said to provide "longer engine
life and better engine protection" because, even though the competitors subject to the
comparison were unnamed, the ad implicitly identified what competitors it was "longer" and
"better" than). Finally, false implied claims are those that, although not literally untrue,
deceive or mislead consumers by their implications. See, e.g., Am. Home Prods. Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568, 588 (finding misleading by its implications a claim
that hospitals recommend "acetaminophen, the aspirin-free pain reliever in Anacin-3, more
than any other pain reliever," because hospitals were recommending Tylenol, which contains
acetaminophen, but the ad conveyed the message that hospitals were recommending Anacin-
3).
20 See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 19, at 14; Jeffrey P. Singdahls, The Risk of Chill: A Cost
of the Standards Governing the Regulation of False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 339, 340 (1991).
2 1 BeVier, supra note 19, at 14.
22 For examples of confusing advertisements, see infra notes 102-05 and accompanying
text.
23 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
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[T]he only legally relevant function of a trademark is to impart
information as to the source or sponsorship of the product....
Preservation of the trademark as a means of identifying the trademark
owner's products, implemented both by the Lanham Act and the
common law, serves an important public purpose. It makes effective
competition possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by
providing a means through which the consumer can identify products
which please him and reward the producer with continued patronage. 24
The beneficial effects of truthful and non-confusing comparative
advertising naturally led both countries to encourage the use of such a
marketing device.
B. The Authorization of Truthful and Non-Confusing Comparative
Advertising
Today, the authorization of comparative advertising appears to be the
rule rather than the exception and has important corollaries in the United
States and in France. However, the two countries have set out identical
limits on the use of this advertising tool by prohibiting the use of false and
confusing claims.
1. The Rule: The Authorization of Comparative Advertising
The French and U.S. regimes have historically been radically different.
While comparative advertising has long been authorized in the United
States, it has been accepted only recently and with much effort in France.
a. In the United States
In the United States, maximizing consumer welfare and promoting a
free and competitive economy have been the guiding objective and "the
keystone of governmental attitude towards the business scene" for more
than 100 years.25 Thus, the use of comparative advertising has rapidly
become a primary goal of judicial and legislative authorities, as well as
administrative agencies, in the area of advertising law.
U.S. courts recognized the legality of truthful comparative advertising
more than thirty years ago. However, until the late 1960's, comparative
advertising was often limited by industry self-regulatory codes. Indeed,
"[a] general feeling [existed] in the advertising industry that naming one's
competitor would only give him free publicity, and might even evoke
24 Id. at 566 (footnote omitted).
25 1 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 1:1 (citation and footnotes omitted). U.S. courts
regularly declare that consumer welfare is the guiding objective in the competition law area.
See supra note 13.
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sympathy for him., 26 Competitors were therefore referred to as "brand X'
or the "leading brand. 2 7  This changed with two decisions in the late
1960's. First, in the leading 1968 Chanel case, the Ninth Circuit permitted
a person who had copied an unpatented product sold under a trademark to
use that trademark in advertising for the purpose of identifying the copied
product, provided that the advertisement was truthful and did not create
confusion as to source or contain misrepresentations.28
Second, and more important, was the 1969 Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Policy Statement on Comparative Advertising, which encouraged the
use of comparisons that name the competitor or the competitive product.2 9
The FTC's statement pointed out that truthful comparative advertising is a
valuable source of information to consumers that could "assist them in
making rational purchase decisions., 30  It further explained that this
marketing device "encourages product improvement and innovation, and
can lead to lower prices in the marketplace. 3 1  However, the negative
consequences of false and confusing comparative claims led the FTC to
require "clarity, and, if necessary, disclosure to avoid deception of the
consumer."
32
The use of comparative claims subsequently increased dramatically in
the United States 33 and the acceptability of this advertising format has
remained unchanged ever since. Courts often mention the beneficial effects
of comparative advertising. For example, the Seventh Circuit held that
comparative advertising naming a competitor is beneficial to consumers
because "[t]hey learn at a glance what kind of product is for sale and how it
differs from a known benchmark. 3 4 In this case, the defendant's packaging
of Life Savers Delites candies stated: "25% LOWER IN CALORIES
THAN WERTHER'S® ORIGINAL* CANDY. 35  Similarly, the Eighth
26 David I. C. Thomson, Problems of Proof in False Comparative Product Advertising:
How Gullible is the Consumer?, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 385, 386 (1982).
27 See Suzanne B. Conlon, Comparative Advertising: Whatever Happened to "Brand
X"?, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 407, 407 (1977).
28 Smith, 402 F.2d 562. See infra note 86, and accompanying text, for a description of the
facts of the Smith case.
29 16 C.F.R. § 14.15 (2004).
30 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c).
31 id.
32 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(b).
33 See, e.g., Barry, supra note 2, at 19; Donthu, supra note 3, at 111; Thomson, supra
note 26, at 387.
34 August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Deere
& Co v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating "as long as the mark is not
altered [comparative advertising] serves the beneficial purpose of imparting factual
information about the relative merits of competing products").
3' August StorckK. G., 59 F.3d at 617.
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Circuit, recognizing the existence of the "strong public interest in lowest
possible prices," refused to issue a preliminary injunction against use of the
trademark "Obsession" in a claim for a perfume advertised as "our version
of Obsession. 36
b. In France
Particular attention must be paid to the three different steps which
characterize the history of the authorization of comparative advertising in
France. Indeed, most of its current limitations 37 find their roots in the old
French hostility toward this advertising tool. In addition, judicial
precedents provide relevant guidelines for the interpretation of the current
comparative advertising law.
First step. Prior to 1992, statutory provisions were lacking and
comparative advertising was considered highly suspect. It was generally
regarded as an improper business practice and, as such, contrary to the rules
of fair play and ethical standards of advertising. 38 The underlying idea was
that "businesses [have to be] protected against unscrupulous outsiders who
do not play by the generally accepted rules."3 9 Hence, the use of another's
trademark in advertising, even if referring to the trademark owner without
causing confusion as to its source, was considered unfair trading on the
owner's reputation and goodwill or as going beyond the limits of
commercial fairness. 40 The courts prohibited the use of comparative
advertising in principle and provided only very limited exceptions to this
prohibition. Even truthful and non-critical comparative claims, such as
statements that the advertiser's product is as good as or equivalent to his
competitor's, were regarded as unfair trading.4 ' Moreover, any reference to
another's prices was strictly forbidden.4 2 The courts prohibited advertisers
36 Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 500 (8th Cir. 1987).
37 See infra Part II.B.3. and Part III.
38 See Antoine Pirovano, PublicitM comparative et protection des consommateurs, D.
1974 chron. 279.
39 See Bodewig, supra note 8, at 190.
40 See Luby, supra note 5, at 12-18. See generally Pirovano, supra note 38 (analyzing
extensively and criticizing previous case law which prohibited comparative advertising as
impairing the competitor's interest).
41 See e.g., CA Paris, Dec. 10, 1963, Ann. Prop. Ind. 1964, 67 (considering unlawful the
comparison with one's competitor's products as likely to capture the competitor's potential
customers), cited in Pirovano, supra note 38.
42 See, e.g., CA Douai, Feb. 16, 1973, J.C.P. 1973, IV, 273 (holding unlawful a
shopkeeper's act of placing in his window a competitor's advertisement showing the
competitor's higher prices together with a claim stating "[c]ompare and make up your mind
before you buy"); Pirovano, supra note 38, citing CA Paris, June 7, 1973, D. 1973, 619
(directing defendant to pay 10,000 Francs damages for distributing a circular to the trade
comparing defendant's prices with plaintiffs prices).
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from disparaging goods manufactured by their competitors that did not
meet regulations,4 3 or from comparing the quality of their products with that
of their competitors. 44 Comparative advertising was generally considered
45synonymous with disparagement. Arguably, this advertising device was
misinforming consumers by inducing them to think the competing product
46was derived from the same source as that of the advertiser. Such a
comparison was deemed confusing to prospective purchasers and therefore
inconsistent with the primary purpose of French trademark law.47
Fortunately, this position does not find any support today as most
commentators agree that comparative advertising is a valuable tool for
48consumer information. While the main concern of this reluctance toward
comparative advertising was the protection of competitor welfare, the
consumer was also "thought to be protected indirectly, but effectively by
keeping up these high standards of market 'morals' through competitors'
actions."4  Such indirect protection of the consumer was not effective. If
the consumer and the competitor have a shared interest in the prohibition of
false and misleading comparative advertising, their interests diverge on
truthful comparative advertising:
[W]hile the consumer values true comparative advertising, the
competitor objects to it. Hence, comparative advertising poses a special
problem... where the rules against unfair competition have as their
main objective the protection of competitors against unfair practices
based on the assumption of a parallelism of interests between consumers
and competitors. ... [T]he indirect protection of consumers, via
43 See, e.g., CA Paris, June 6, 1964, D. 1964 somm., 103 (holding that defendants cannot
inform the buying public that the methods used by their competitors do not comply with the
regulation enacted by the public health ministry).
44 See, e.g., Pirovano, supra note 38, citing Cass. com., July 19, 1973, D. 1973, 587; CA
Paris, Jan. 24, 1967, Ann. Prop. Ind. 1967, 112 (ruling that one cannot compare his products
to his competitor's products in ways that put the competitor at a disadvantage, even when
scientific evidence supports the comparison); Trib. civ. Seine, Nov. 5, 1949, Ann. Prop. Ind.
1950, 42 (holding unfair an ad stating that one's lozenges are more effective that one's
competitor's); Trib. civ. Seine, Nov. 14, 1925, Ann. Prop. Ind. 1926, 341 (declaring unfair a
statement that one's product does not have the defects of a competitor's product).
45 See Jean-Jacques Biolay, PublicitJ comparative, 902 Juris-classeur Concurrence-
Consommation 6 (2003).
46 See Luby, supra note 5, 8.
47 Georges Bonet, L 'usage de la marque d'autrui dans la publicit, LE NOUVEAU DROIT
DES MARQUES EN FRANCE 109 (Litec, Publications de I'IRPI No. 10, 1991). Article L.711-1
of the Code de Propritg Intellectuelle [Intellectual Property Code] [hereinafter IPC]
explicitly defines the trademark as "a sign ... which serves to distinguish the goods or
services of a natural or legal person."
48 See, e.g., CALAIS-AULOY & STEINMETZ, supra note 13, at 123 126.
49 See Bodewig, supra note 8, at 190.
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competitor actions, [does] not work.
50
European institutions have played an important role in the evolution of
the French approach toward comparative advertising. In 1975, the Council
of the European Economic Community announced a policy favoring
comparative advertising as a means of facilitating consumer choice among
products. It adopted a Resolution articulating five basic consumers' rights,
among them the consumers' right to information. 51 This right rested on the
idea that "sufficient information should be made available" to enable the
consuming public to assess the basic features, including the nature, quality,
quantity, and price, of the goods and services marketed, and to "make a
rational choice between competing products and services ...., Similarly,
the 1991 European Commission's proposal for a Council Directive on
comparative advertising 3 supported the necessity of harmonizing this
marketing format in the Community.54  In particular, it pointed out that
comparative advertising was a means of both improving consumer
information and promoting competition.5
'o Id. at 188.
51 Council Resolution of Apr. 14, 1975 on the Preliminary Programme of the European
Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and Information Policy, 1975 O.J. (C 92)
1 [hereinafter Council Resolution].
52 1d. Annex 34.
53 Commission Proposal of May 28, 1991 for a Council Directive Concerning
Comparative Advertising and Amending Directive 84/450/EEC Concerning Misleading
Advertising, 1991 O.J. (C 180) 14.
54 The idea was generally accepted that harmonizing the rules governing comparative
advertising law in the European Union had become a necessity. See generally Rafael Cepas
Palanca, The directive on comparative advertising, 3 REVUE DES AFFAIRES EuRoPtENNEs
195, 198 (1998).
[D]ifferences between advertising rules in the Member States can complicate the marketing
process and may go so far as to disrupt the free movement of goods and the availability of
services in the European single market ....
The Court of Justice has on a number of occasions dealt with situations where an
advertisement, lawful in one Member State has run up against the laws of a neighboring
Member State; in the INNO-BM case, the court held that a particular law of this type
constituted an obstacle to the free movement of goods within the meaning of article 30 of the
Treaty and was not justifiable under article 36 or other imperative principles.
Id. at 198.
55 See id. at 197. Analyzing the main reasons which justified, in the Commission's view,
the presentation of the proposal for a Council Directive on comparative advertising, the
author explains:
Faced with such diverse information, consumers will benefit more from comparative
advertising, which will demonstrate the merits of different goods belonging to the same
range, than from other sources of information.
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The position thus held by European institutions has, to some extent,
led French consumers' associations, as well as some researchers and
practitioners, to criticize the country's traditional stance against the use of
comparative advertising. Academic researchers assert that the interests of
competing enterprises to have comparative advertising prohibited should
not prevail over the necessity to ensure market openness and to inform
consumers. 56  This idea was also supported by the leading French
consumers' organizations (Union F~d~rale des Consommateurs, Institut
National de la Consommation, Association Force Ouvrire
Consommateurs, etc.). At the time of the debate over the adoption of the
1992 law on comparative advertising,57 these organizations announced a
policy favoring the use of comparative claims as a means of increasing
consumer protection by facilitating consumer information and enhancing
competition.
58
Second step. The remarkable shift in the attitude toward comparative
advertising leads to fundamental changes in French advertising law. A
breakthrough in the comparative advertising arena occurred in July 1986
when the Cour de Cassation abandoned the prohibition of this advertising
format.59 Law 92-60 of January 18, 1992 codified the guidelines set out by
the court.6 °  It authorized comparative advertising in principle, but
surrounded its use with strict limitations in order to protect the interests of
Authorization of the comparative advertising technique throughout the single market will
[also] better equip firms to make an effective challenge to leading brands. The resulting
increase in competition will benefit consumers and favor innovative and enterprising firms.
The present situation where comparative advertising is allowed in some Member States
puts advertisers in other Member State at disadvantage.
Id.
56 Paul-Philippe Massoni, Publicitj comparative, 5 Juris-classeur Contrats-Distribution,
fascicule 4140, 4 (1994). See, e.g., Pirovano, supra note 38.
57 See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
58 See Massoni, supra note 56, 4. The proposal for a new Consumer Code prepared by
the Commission for the Rewriting of Consumer Law in 1990 also suggested that
comparative advertising be liberally permitted in order to stimulate competition and facilitate
consumer information. See Commission de Refonte du Droit de la Consommation,
Propositions pour un Code de la Consommation, art. L.55, LA DOCUMENTATION FRAN(;AISE
23 (1990).
59 Cass. com., July 22, 1986, J.C.P. 1987, II, 14901, note Gavalda & Lucas de Leyssac.
60 Law No. 92-60 of Jan. 18, 1992 Reinforcing the Protection of Consumers, J.O., Dec.
21, 1992, p. 968; D.L. 1992, p. 129 [hereinafter the 1992 Act]. For a discussion on the
provisions of the 1992 Act, see, e.g., Jean-Claude Fourgoux, L'article 10 de la loi du 18
janvier 1992. Feu sur la publicitj comparative, Gaz. Pal. 1, doctr. 279 (1992); Luby, supra
note 5; Yolande Serandour, L'avinement de la publicitg comparative en France: article 10
de la loi No. 92-60 du 18 janvier 1992 renforgant la protection des consommateurs, J.C.P.
1992, 1, 3596.
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both consumers and competitors subject to the comparison.6 1  Those
restrictions were ultimately so restrictive that most comparative claims were
prohibited by courts.62 The most "unexpected limitation" in the 1992 Act
was the requirement for comparative advertisers to disclose, in advance, the
comparative advertisement to the competitors named or referred to in the
61 In relevant part, article 10 of the 1992 Act read:
I. An advertisement that contains comparisons between goods or services and thereby
mentions or shows the trade or service mark, name, logo or the presentation [i.e. "look and
feel"] of another party is permitted only if it is fair, truthful and not likely to mislead
consumers.
It must be limited to an objective comparison that may only concern essential, important,
determinant, and verifiable qualities of products of a comparative nature available on the
market. If the comparison concerns price, only comparable goods sold under comparable
terms may be compared and the time during which the advertiser will maintain the price
mentioned for his own goods must be stated. Comparative advertising must not be based on
individual or collective opinions or impressions. No comparison may be directed toward
taking advantage from the notoriety of a mark. No comparison may present goods or services
as imitations or copies of trademarked goods or services. If merchandise carries a controlled
mark of origin, comparison may only take place among goods all bearing the same origin
mark. Use of comparative advertising of the kind described above on packages, invoices,
transport documents, means of payments or entrance tickets to events or at public places is
prohibited ....
Each of the above provisions was directly contrary to U.S. law. Particularly interesting was
the prohibition of claims supported by "individual or collective opinions or impressions."
The purpose of this provision was to prohibit comparative advertisements based on tests,
studies or surveys, such as "studies show consumers prefer product X more than product Y."
See Massoni, supra note 56, 29. This provision was contrary to the lawfulness of the so-
called "establishment claims" in the United States. Establishment claims are claims
indicating that consumers prefer one product to another or that scientific or experimental
evidence supports the claim. Advertisements stating that "tests prove that product X lasts
longer than product Y," that "studies prove that doctors prefer product X to product Y," or
that "surveys show that product X is safer," are lawful in the United States provided that the
test, study or survey mentioned in the ad is "sufficiently reliable" to support the claim. See
Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1992). It must be pointed out
that current French law on comparative advertising, which results from the 2001 Decree,
does not prohibit claims based on "individual or collective opinions or impressions." Since
the current law has given rise to little litigation, we have to wait for future cases in order to
determine whether the suppression of "individual or collective opinions or impressions" can
be understood as authorizing establishment claims.
For a discussion on the differences between French and U.S. law, see infra Part III.
Although they focus on the present law of comparative advertising as resulting from the
2001 Decree, the developments of Part III can be applied to the provisions of the 1992 Act
which have only been slightly modified by the 2001 Decree. See infra text accompanying
notes 72-74.
62 See, e.g., CA Douai, Oct. 2, 1995, D. 1996, 99, note Fourgoux. See generally CALAIS-
AULOY & STErNMETZ, supra note 13, at 123 126 (criticizing the 1992 Act as establishing
stringent limits on comparative advertising).
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ad, in order to enable them to defend against it.63  This disclosure
requirement was regarded as a major obstacle to the use of comparative
advertising.64 It allowed the competitor either to commercially retaliate
with his own advertising campaign or to apply for an injunction restraining
publication of the comparative claim. In the end, it deterred advertisers
from using comparisons.
Advertisements that did not comply with the requirements of the law
were prosecuted as disparaging, misleading advertising, or trademark
infringement.66  For example, the Cour d'appel de Paris prohibited an
advertisement displaying a picture of three cookies together with a chart
indicating the health risks resulting from the consumption of or exposure to
various products: compared to the exposure to tobacco smoke which ranked
eighth with a risk of lung cancer of 1.19, the consumption of one cookie per
day ranked fifth with a risk of cardiovascular disease of 1.49. The text of
the ad stated "[t]obacco smoke in the air - Life is plenty of risks. But all
are not identifiable." ,The court declared the ad disparaging to cookie
manufacturers.6 7  By contrast, it was on the ground of misleading
advertising that the Cour d'appel de Bourges enjoined use of a price
comparison. The claim compared the prices of a superstore to those of its
competitor, but it only concerned a small number of goods that were not
representative of the most commonly purchased products. The court held
that the ad falsely induced the purchasing public to think that prices were
generally lower in the advertiser's superstore.
68
Third step. The 1992 Act remained in force until the adoption on
August 23, 2001 of Decree 2001-741,69 which implemented European
63 Fabrice Picod, L 'obligation de communication pr~alable 6 l 'preuve de la directive
communautaire sur la publicitg comparative, Dalloz Affaires 2001, chron. 914, 914. See
generally Massoni, supra note 56, 57-60 (analyzing the terms and remedies of the
disclosure requirement).
64 Eric Andrieu, Nouvelle riglementation en mati&e de publicit6 comparative, 186
LtGIPRESSE 136 (2001); see also Picod, supra note 63, at 914, 914 n.7.
65 See Picod, supra note 63, at 914.
66 The tableaux de concordance practice, for example, was prohibited as infringing the
famous perfume manufacturer's trademarks. See infra text accompanying notes 143-405 for
a discussion on the tableaux de concordance practice.
67 CA Paris, Sept. 24, 1996, D. 1997, 235; see also, e.g., CA Douai, Oct. 2, 1995, D.
1996, 99, note Fourgoux (ruling that it was disparaging for the ad to present two pictures
side by side, one representing the advertiser's service and evoking a sun explosion, the other
representing the competitor's service under a dark sky).
68 CA Bourges, Mar. 6, 1984, Gaz. Pal. 1984, 1, pan. jurispr. 370. See also Cass. crim.,
Dec. 22, 1986, D. 1987, 286, note Cas; CA Pau, Dec. 7, 1983, Revue Internationale de la
Propridt6 Industrielle et Artistique 84 (1988).
69 Decree No. 2001-741 of August 23, 2001, J.O., Aug. 25, 2001, p. 13645; D.L. 2001,
2486 [hereinafter the 2001 Decree]. For a discussion on the provisions of the 2001 Decree,
see Andrieu, supra note 64, at 136; Philippe Laurent, La publiciti comparative harmonisge,
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Directive 97/55/EC of October 6, 1997, on comparative advertising. 70 The
provisions of the 2001 Decree are now codified as articles L.121-8, 9, 10,
11, and 12 of the Code de la Consommation.71 The implementation of the
10 CONTRATS, CONC., CONSOM. 6 (2001); Jer6me Passa, Brave pr~sentation du droit de la
publicit comparative aprks la transposition de la directive communautaire, 3 PROPRITtS
INTELLECTUELLES 32 (2002); Guy Raymond, Ordonnance du 23 aofit 2002 portant
transposition des directives communautaires en matibre de droit de la consommation, J.C.P.
2001, 1, 50; Guy Raymond, Publicit comparative. Definition de la publicit comparative et
utilisation de la marque d'autrui, 5 CONTRATS, CONC., CONSOM 28 (2002).
70 Council Directive 97/55/EC of 6 October 1997 Amending Directive 84/450/EEC
Concerning Misleading Advertising so as to Include Comparative Advertising, 1997 O.J. (L
290) 18; D.L. 1997, 358 [hereinafter the 1997 European Directive]. In the mid 1970's, the
Council and the Commission decided to harmonize the rules governing misleading
advertising in the European Union. They adopted a Directive concerning misleading
advertising in 1984. See Council Directive 84/450/EEC of Sept. 10, 1984 Relating to the
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member
States Concerning Misleading Adverting, 1984 O.J. (L 250) 17. However, because Greece
refused to deal with comparative advertising, the Directive contained no provisions on this
advertising format. The European Commission then decided to deal with comparative
advertising separately and adopted the 1997 European Directive. It amended Directive
84/450/EEC on misleading advertising to include certain provisions on comparative
advertising. The new provisions authorize comparative advertising while establishing a
number of safeguards in order to prevent unfair and misleading advertising. See 1997
European Directive, at art. 3(a)(1). For further details on the historical background of the
1997 European Directive, see Cepas Palanca, supra note 54, at 196-200.
For a discussion on the provisions of the 1997 European Directive, see Jacques-Philippe
Gunther, Le parlement europ~en harmonise la publicit comparative, LES ECHOS, Oct. 10,
1997, 57.
71 French Consumer Code [hereinafter C. CON.]. The new regulation defines comparative
advertising as any advertising that expressly or implicitly identifies a competitor or goods or
services offered by a competitor. C. CON. at art. L. 121-8. It then sets out a number of limits
to the use of comparative advertising:
Article L. 121-8
Any advertising which makes a comparison between goods or services by identifying,
implicitly or explicitly, a competitor or goods and services offered by a competitor is only
legal if:
10 It is not false or likely to mislead;
20 It relates to goods or services fulfilling the same requirements or having the same
objective;
30 It objectively compares one or more essential, pertinent, verifiable and
representative characteristics of these goods or services, one of which may be price.
Any comparative advertising referring to a special offer must clearly state the dates when the
goods and services offered are to be available, where appropriate, the fact that the offer is
limited to available stocks and the specific terms applicable.
Article L.121-9
Comparative advertising may not:
10 Take unfair advantage of the reputation attached to a trademark, manufacturer's
brand or service mark, to a trade name, to other distinctive marks of a competitor or to
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Community legislation slightly relaxed the conditions of legality of
comparative advertising:72 the principle remains that its authorization and
the limits on its use are less draconian than those set out by the 1992 Act.
The main modifications of the 2001 Decree concern the suppression of the
disclosure requirement 73 and the broadening of the definition of the
products and services that can be compared.74 Part III discusses whether the
remaining limits are flexible enough for the authorization of comparative
advertising to be in practice as it is in theory or, on the contrary, whether
they are so severe that they shall be regarded as a de facto prohibition of
comparative advertising.
2. Shared Corollaries to the Authorization of Comparative Advertising
a. A Broad Definition of Comparative Advertising
A claim is a form of comparative advertising as long as it allows the
identification of the competitor or the competitive product, either explicitly
or implicitly. It need not expressly name a competitor to be comparative.
The rule is set out by Article L.121-8 of the French Consumer Code (C.
Con.), 75 and by the courts in the United States. In Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil
the designation of origin as well as the protected geographical indication of a
competing product;
20 Lead to the discrediting or denigration of marks, trade names, other distinctive signs,
goods, services, activity or situation of a competitor;
30 Engender confusion between the advertiser and a competitor or between the
advertiser's marks, trade names, other distinctive signs, goods or services and those of a
competitor;
40 Present goods or services as an imitation or reproduction of goods or services with a
protected mark or trade name.
Article L.121-10
For products with a protected designation of origin or geographical indication, comparison is
only authorized between products each with the same designation of origin or the same
indication.
Article L.121-12
[T]he advertiser on behalf of which the comparative advertising is being circulated must be
in a position to prove, within a short time, the physical accuracy of the statements,
indications and presentations contained within the advertising.
For an analysis of the most relevant provisions of the new regulation, see infra Part I11.
72 For an analysis of the limits on comparative advertising established by the 2001
Decree, see infra Part II.B.3. and Part III.
73 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
"4 See infra Part II.B.2.b.
75 See C. CON. at art. L.121-8, supra note 71. See, e.g., Cass. com., Mar. 27, 2001, Gaz.
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Co., the Third Circuit held that an advertisement stating that the advertised
motor oil "outperforms any leading motor oil against viscosity breakdown"
and provides "longer engine life and better engine protection" was
comparative, even though the competitors were not expressly mentioned by
name. 76 The court declared, "[t]here need not be a direct comparison to a
competitor for a statement to be actionable under the Lanham Act.",77 In a
like manner, a New York District Court held that a claim which reproduced
the headline and included a satire of a drawing recently used by the
competitor in advertising was a form of comparative advertisement because
it indirectly referred to the competitor. 78 Likewise, in L & F Products v.
Procter & Gamble Co., the court acknowledged that using a competitor's
identifiable product silhouette was comparative advertising.79 In this case,
where "the 'competitor' bottle used in the commercials [was] in the shape
of the [plaintiffs] bottle [and] the competitor bottle used in the
commercials contained [plaintiff's product]," defendant "did not dispute
plaintiffs claim that the commercials used [plaintiffs product] as the
competing product.,
80
b. A Broad Definition of the Object of the Comparison
French and U.S. laws also extensively define the object of the
comparison. In this regard, the French 2001 Decree amended the 1992 Act,
which required that the comparison occur between "products or services of
Pal. 2001, somm. 2089; CA Versailles, June 27, 2002, J.C.P. 2003 E, II, 56. Although the
1992 Act required that the competitor be specifically named in order for the advertisement to
be comparative, courts considered that as long as the competitor could be identified, the ad
was comparative. In this respect, the new law restates case law developed over many years.
See, e.g., T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 18, 1992, Gaz. Pal. 1993, jur. 265 (holding that it is a form of
comparative ad when there is a claim stating that natural gas is cheaper than gas produced
through steam because it implicitly refers to the Compagnie Parisienne de Chauffage
Urbain), cited in Andrieu, supra note 64, at 134 n.5; T.G.I. Paris, Feb. 18, 1989, Gaz. Pal.
1989, 7 (declaring that identifying competitors is easier when there are a few of them), cited
in JAMEs R. MAXEINER, PETER SCHOTTHOFER, ADVERTISING LAW IN EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA § 13 n.73 (Aspen Publishers, 2d ed. 1999). On the contrary, when the competitor
cannot be identified, the ad is not a form of comparative advertising.
76 987 F.2d 939, 941 (3d Cir. 1993).
17 Id. at 946.
78 H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 1985 WL 9700, at 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
79 845 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
80 Id. at 991. It is an interesting fact that, under U.S. law, harm is presumed when a direct
comparison is made, i.e. when the competitor is expressly mentioned by name, but must be
shown otherwise. The Second Circuit held that "[tihe type and quantity of proof required to
show injury and causation has varied from one case to another depending on the particular
circumstances. On the whole, we have tended to require a more substantial showing
where ... the defendant's advertisements do not draw direct comparisons between the two."
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 694 (2nd Cir. 1994).
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a comparable nature available on the market."8' The current legislation
offers more flexibility than the former regime to comparative advertisers by
allowing comparisons between products or services "meeting the same
needs or intended for the same purpose., 82 Consequently, similar products
such as sunflower and olive oils, butter and margarine, gas and electric
heating, or the services offered by airlines and railroads can now be
compared. Similarly, U.S. courts authorize comparisons between different,
but nevertheless interchangeable, products. The comparison is legitimate if
it is sensible in light of consumer uses of the products or services compared.
Price is also an element that can be compared in both countries.
Whereas price comparisons were allowed within narrow limits under the
1992 Act," the new French regime does not set any specific restriction to
their use84 and therefore mirrors U.S. law more closely. Indeed, in theUnited States,
It is entirely permissible for an advertiser to make price comparisons
between its products and similar, but not identical, products which its
competitors offer.... The general rules regarding deceptive advertising
would apply if an advertiser were to falsely claim that its product is of
comparable value to a much superior product.
85
The Chanel case offers an illustration of lawful U.S. price
comparison.86  The advertisement stated that the appellant's perfumes
"duplicate 100% Perfect the exact scent of the world's finest and most
expensive perfumes and colognes at prices that will zoom sales to volumes
you have never before experienced" and "[w]e dare you to try to detect any
difference between Chanel #5 (25.00) and Ta'Ro's 2nd Chance. $7.00."
7
In France, a relevant example of a price comparison is provided by a
relatively recent Cour d'appel de Paris case. The court decided that a
television advertising campaign for a telephone company comparing the
advertiser's basic rate with his competitor's price plan was licit and, thus, in
accordance with the new provisions of the 2001 Decree, a comparison may
be made between non-identical but interchangeable products or services.
88
81 1992 Act, at art. 10. See supra note 61.
82 C. CON., at art. L. 121-8(2). See supra note 71.
83 1992 Act, at art. 10. See supra note 61.
84 C. CON., at art. L.121-8(3). See supra note 71.
85 2 ROBERT B. HUGHES, LEGAL COMPLIANCE CHECKUPS: BUSINESS CLIENTS § 12:21 n.2
(Callaghan 1985).
86 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
87 Id. at 563.
88 CA Paris, Dec. 4, 2002, 4 CONTRATS, CONC., CoNsoM., 33 (2003). But cf. Trib. com.,
Paris, May 7, 2003, 2 CONTRATS, CONC., CONSOM. 31-32 (2004) (declaring unlawful the
comparison between the rates of two telephone companies because no information was
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3. Shared Limits on Comparative Advertising
a. The Prohibition of False Comparative Advertising
Article L.121-8(1) of C. Con. provides that the comparison must be
truthful and should not be likely to mislead consumers. 89 In this respect, the
current provisions of French law do not differ from those of the 1992 Act,90
which themselves codified the courts' longstanding practice of prohibiting
false comparative claims. Therefore, the provisions of Article L. 121-8(1)
C. Con. are usually interpreted and applied in the same way as those of
Article 10 of the 1992 Act.91  An illustration of a false comparative
advertising case subsequent to the enactment of the 2001 Decree is
provided by the Cour de cassation. The court held that it was misleading
for a cosmetics store to claim that it was selling certain products at the
lowest price on the market when those products were actually priced for
less in superstores.92  Similarly, the Cour d'appel de Versailles recently
held an advertisement comparing the national rates of two telecoms
companies to be untruthful and likely to mislead consumers. The ad
defined the national rate as that applying to "calls made more than fifty-two
kilometers away" but the competitor referred to in the advertisement
charged some of those calls at the local rate.
93
The same result may occur in the United States, where false
comparative advertising can be actionable under both federal and state law.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides competitors with a federal cause
of action for false or misleading advertising. 94 The FTC may also intervene
provided with regard to the way the alleged saving was calculated and to the competitor's
specific rate which had been taken into account in the comparison).
89 The requirement that the claim be truthful and not mislead consumers applies to any
type of advertisement, not only to comparative advertisements.
90 1992 Act, at art. 10. See supra note 61.
91 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
92 Cass. com., July 1, 2003, J.C.P. 2003 E, 38, 1461.
93 Jamal Henni, La publicitM comparative de Tele2 condamn~e en appel, LES
ECHOS, Aug. 20, 2004, 19.
94 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act reads in the pertinent part:
(1) Any person who...
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2004).
Congress amended Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act in 1988 to include statements made by
389
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against false or deceptive advertisements as a result of Section 5 of the FTC
Act.95 At the state level, the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act96 and
the "little FTC Acts" 97 are valuable tools against advertisers who engage in
the advertiser about "his or her or another person's" products. Before the amendment, courts
recognized the existence of a federal cause of action for false statements about one's own
products, but considered that Section 43(a) did not encompass false statements about one's
competitor's goods. Since the amendment, they have also applied Section 43(a) to false
statements about one's competitor's products.
Plaintiff must prove several elements in order to establish a false advertising claim under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: (1) a false statement of fact, (2) in interstate commerce,
(3) in connection with commercial advertising or promotion, (4) that actually deceives or has
the capacity to deceive an appreciable number of consumers, (5) that is material, i.e. likely to
influence purchasing decisions, and (6) causes or is likely to cause injury to the plaintiff.
Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974); see also, e.g.,
Tacquino v. Teledyne Monark Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1500 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating "to
succeed it must be proved that: (1) [defendant] made a false statement of fact about their
product; (2) statements deceived or had the capacity to deceive a substantial segment of
potential customers; (3) the deception is material in that it is likely to influence the
purchasing decision; (4) [defendant] caused its product to enter interstate commerce; and (5)
[plaintiff] has been or is likely to be injured as a result.").
95 Section 5 of the FTC Act declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition. .. and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2004). The
FTC Act, which created the FTC, was passed by Congress in 1914. At that time, the FTC
had a mandate to prohibit only "[u]nfair methods of competition... in or affecting
commerce." The prohibition of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" was added in 1938 by
the Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the FTC. The courts consider three basic elements in any
deceptive trade practice case under the FTC Act: (1) "there must be a representation,
omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer;" (2) the consumers who are
likely to be misled must be "acting reasonably under the circumstances;" and (3) "the
representation, omission or practice must be a material one." Kraft Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d
311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992).
96 The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides in relevant part:
§ 2. Deceptive trade practices. (a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when...
he:
(5) Represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics,
ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that a person has a
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have;
(8) Disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false representation of
fact ....
UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (REVISED) § 2(a) (2003). The Act has been enacted
by about a dozen states, including Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon.
97 The expression "little FTC Acts" designates some form of consumer protection statute
which has been adopted by many states. These state statutes are traditionally known as
"little FTC Acts" because their language is very similar to the language of the FTC Act.
Their provisions may encompass false comparative advertising. For example, the
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abusive comparative advertising. Different state law causes of action can
also apply to comparative advertising, such as tortious interference with
economic advantage, negligence, and product or trade disparagement.
98
Although the FTC, the courts, the states' "little FTC Acts," and false
advertising statutes define false comparative advertising in different ways,
they all take aim at advertising that deceives or misleads consumers so as to
influence their purchasing choices and facilitate sales. U.S. courts enjoin
the use of claims of equivalence as soon as it is proved that the plaintiffs
product is superior to the defendant's. Summary judgment was granted
against a cigar maker who claimed to sell identical copies of more
expensive famous cigar brands and also claimed to perform "a certain
amount of work... in an effort to duplicate the original," because the
imitator did not duplicate "the particular region and regional conditions" of
the tobacco used in the original cigars.99 By contrast, superiority claims are
held false if it can be shown that the plaintiff's good is equivalent or
superior to the defendant's. For example, a television advertisement stating
"[t]ests prove Quaker State 1OW-30 [motor oil] protects [engine parts]
better than any other leading 1OW motor oil" was found to be false and in
violation of the Lanham Act. The advertised motor oil did not ensure better
protection of the engine parts and, therefore, was not superior. 1°°
b. The Prohibition of Confusing Comparative Advertising
Article L.121-9(3) C. Con. provides that the comparative
advertisement "may not cause confusion in the marketplace between the
advertiser and a competitor or between the advertiser's trade marks ... and
those of its competitor."' 1°  Non-confusion was already required under
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act prohibits "unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A, § 2(a) (2003). Similarly,
the California Business & Professional Code defines "unfair competition" to mean
"unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising," CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2003), and the Florida Annotated
Statute declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West 2003).
98 See Harrison, supra note 2, at 232-34 (stating the elements of and case law relating to
each of these causes of action). For a brief comparison of the product disparagement cause of
action in the United States and in France, see infra note 168.
99 JR Tobacco, Inc. v. Davidoff of Geneva (CT), Inc., 957 F. Supp. 426, 433-34
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). See also, Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp.
568, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding false an unqualified equivalence claim for analgesics
because it was true for mild to moderate pain, but not for strong pain).
100 Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1992).
1Ol Although this analysis may also apply to trade names and other distinctive signs, it
will focus on trademarks as they are the distinctive signs most frequently involved in
comparative advertising.
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former French law and courts usually prohibited comparative
advertisements creating confusion as infringing upon the competitor's
distinctive mark. Thus, the tableaux de concordance practice is prohibited
as creating confusion in the buying public's mind as to the source of the
products. 102 This practice consists of lawfully creating copies of famous
products and of advertising them as equivalent to, but cheaper than, the
famous products. For instance, the Tribunal de grande instance de Paris
held that the use of a sign by a superstore that was very similar to the logo
registered as a trademark by the National Council of Pharmacists Order
was, under certain circumstances, likely to create confusion. 10 3 By contrast,
courts expressly consider lawful claims which do not confuse consumers.
For example, a radio station (NRJ) brought an action against another station
(95.2) regarding the following advertisement: "Hi NRJ. 95.2 FM is coming.
Music OK. Info OK. Cinema OK. Concerts OK. 6 months after its launch
95.2 already ranks second on the FM frequency band." NRJ argued that the
ad was creating a likelihood of confusion between the two radio stations.
The court held that there was no likelihood of confusion because of the use
of the verb "is coming," which unmistakably referred to 95.2.104
Similarly, U.S. courts have declared as unlawful those comparative
claims which are likely to confuse the buying public as to the origin of the
products or services. In the well-known Charles of the Ritz Group v.
Quality King Distributors, Inc. case, the Southern District of New York,
finding "a deliberate attempt to have the consumer identify the Omni
product as originating from the same source as Opium," preliminarily
enjoined defendant's use of the slogan "[i]f you like Opium you'll love
Omni.
,105
U.S. courts also generally prohibit use of comparisons between
competing goods in advertising where other aspects of either the
advertisement or the advertiser's product's packaging make the comparison
confusing as to source.'0 6  For example, a claim containing a price list
102 See infra text accompanying notes 143-45 for a discussion on the tableaux de
concordance practice.
103 T.G.I. Paris, Jan. 11, 1998, 1988 Bull. l'Ordre des Pharmaciens No. 309, 330, cited in
Biolay, supra note 45, 55.
104 CA Paris, Mar. 16, 1984, Gaz. Pal. 1984, I, pan. jurispr. 369.
105 636 F. Supp. 433, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). It must be pointed out that where trademark
infringement is found, the courts' tendency is to consider that the infringer's use of a
"like/love" slogan may exacerbate the likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb,
Inc. v. Nevitt Sales Corp., 810 F. Supp. 466, 477 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (issuing an injunction
against defendant's use of the slogan "if you like Ray-Ban, you'll love Rayex," considering
that it would exacerbate defendant's infringement of plaintiffs trademark). However, courts
refuse to enjoin the use of "like/love" advertisements where there is no likelihood of
confusion. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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reproducing both the advertiser's and the competitor's trademarks was held
to create a likelihood of confusion because use of the word "versus"
between the two trademarks was insufficient to allow consumers to identify
the source of each product. 07
Hence, the above developments tend to show that comparative
advertising is now widely-if not universally-accepted on both sides of
the Atlantic, insofar as it is neither false nor confusing. At this point of the
analysis, the two regimes seem very similar and in line with the policy
objectives of free competition and consumer welfare. Yet, in spite of these
shared objectives and outward similarities, fundamental distinctions still
exist between the French and U.S. laws of comparative advertising.
III. DIFFERENT LIMITATIONS ON COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING
U.S. and French laws take different stands when it comes to either
general and vague comparisons or comparisons dealing with the value of a
competitor's mark.
A. Vague and General Comparative Advertising
Contrary to U.S. puffery rules, the French requirement of objectivity
prohibits vague and general comparative statements. This contrast between
the two regimes may well be explained by the fact that the two countries
take different consumer standards into account when judging advertising.
1. French Objectivity Requirement Versus U.S. Puffery Defense
Under article L.121-8(3) C. Con., the claim should "objectively
compare.., relevant, decisive, verifiable and representative features of the
goods or services .... 1, 08  This requirement of objectivity has been
judicially developed over the years and was enacted into positive law by the
1992 Act. It reflects both the courts' and the legislature's concern with
making comparative advertising a tool of information for consumers about
the features of the goods or services marketed. Simply put, it means that
the claim has to compare the characteristics of the goods or services. Any
vague, general, or subjective statement is forbidden. Therefore, claims such
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 22:28 (Callaghan, 4th ed. 1998).
107 Oral-B Labs., Inc. v. Mi-Lor Corp., 810 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1987), cited in ALTMAN
& CALLMANN, supra note 106, § 22:28.
108 C. CON., at art. L.121-8(3). The requirement that the feature be "decisive" can be
compared to the U.S. materiality requirement. In the United States, to be actionable, a
falsehood must be "material," i.e. likely to influence consumers in making their purchasing
decisions. Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974); see
also, e.g., Zine v. Chrysler Corp., 600 N.W.2d 384, 398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (stating "a
material fact for the purposes of [Michigan law] would... be one that is important to the
transaction or affects the consumer's decision to enter into the transaction.").
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as "product X is better than product Y" are unlawful and elements such as
taste, flavor, smell, aesthetics, smoothness, or sweetness cannot be
compared. Comparative advertising is, thus, de facto prohibited for goods
such as perfumes and food.' 09
French courts have always strictly interpreted and applied the
objectivity requirement. The Tribunal de grande instance de Paris had to
address the issue of whether an advertisement stating that the firm Renault
sold twice as many cars in Germany as its competitor, Volkswagen, sold in
France, was lawful. The figures indicated in the ad were correct, but the
text of the ad conveyed the message that they were the result of the inferior
quality of Volkswagen cars. The court considered that the advertisement
was too general to constitute an objective source of information, even
though the plaintiff had not shown that it was untrue. 110 Likewise, a general
claim stating that a magazine is superior to another without providing any
information on the competitor has been prohibited by the Cour d'appel de
Paris as failing to meet the objectivity requirement. 11 More recently, the
Cour d'appel de Versailles held that an advertisement for a telephone
company claiming that the competitor had raised its subscription fee but
failing to provide information on the background context for the raise
lacked objectivity and, therefore, was prohibited." 
2
The provisions of French law regarding the objectivity requirement
differ from the rules prevailing under U.S. advertising law. U.S. law only
prohibits false statements of fact, as opposed to statements of opinions.
A statement of fact is a "specific and measurable claim, capable of being
proved false or of being reasonably interpreted as a statement of objective
fact." ' 1 4  By contrast, when an assertion is "obviously a statement of
opinion," it cannot "reasonably be seen as stating or implying provable
facts."' '15  Such opinion-type statements are commonly referred to as
"puffery." U.S. courts have traditionally ruled that vague and general
109 Massoni, supra note 56, 1 28.
110 T.G.I. Paris, Sept. 23, 1991, Gaz. Pal. 1991, 2, pan. jurispr. 576.
111 CA Paris, 4e ch., July 1, 1998, D. 1998, inf. rap. 197; see also CA Paris, 4e ch. B,
Sept. 10, 1999, D. 1999, 30 (holding unlawful a general claim stating that a radio station is
superior to another).
112 CA Versailles, June 27, 2002, J.C.P. 2003 E, II, 56.
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2003); see also, e.g., Randa Corp. v. Mulberry Thai Silk,
Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718, 2000 WL 1741680, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2000) (holding that a
statement that licensor is going to suffer a 30% revenue loss due to competition is opinion-
type puffery and therefore non-actionable).
114 Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir.
1999); see also Presidio Enters., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distrib. Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 679 (5th
Cir. 1986) (stating "[a] statement of fact is one that (1) admits of being adjudged true or false
in a way that (2) admits of empirical verification.").
115 Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995).
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comparatives such as "better than" or "more than" are not actionable as
false comparative advertising because reasonable consumers could not
believe these statements to be assertions of fact.1 16 As the Fifth Circuit
explained, non-actionable puffery can take the form of "a general claim of
superiority over comparable products that is so vague that it can be
understood as nothing more than a mere expression of opinion.
'' 17
Generally, puffery has four characteristics: it is general and vague; 118 it
makes a claim that is immeasurable, unquantifiable or unverifiable;, 19 it is
presented as a subjective statement; 20 and it is the kind of claim upon
which consumers are unlikely to rely.'
2'
Therefore, the language of French law strongly contrasts with the
terms used by U.S. courts to determine whether a claim is puffery.
Whereas comparative statements are licit only if they concern "verifiable"
qualities of the products in France, immeasurable or unverifiable claims are
non-actionable puffery under U.S. law. Additionally, while comparative
claims must concern "relevant, decisive ... and representative" features of
the goods or services concerned under Article L.121-8(3) C. Con., puffery
is a general and vague statement under U.S. law. In essence, while French
law requires the advertisement to be useful to consumers, U.S. law
encourages comparisons which are of less use to consumers.
116 See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 926 (3d
Cir. 1990) (finding that the health insurer's claim "Better than HMO. So good, it's Blue
Cross and Blue Shield" is puffery), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990).
117 Pizza Hut, Inc., v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000).
118 See, e.g., Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d at 926; Smith-Victor Corp. v.
Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302, 308 (N.D. 111. 1965) (finding "advertising
which merely states in general terms that one product is superior is not actionable.").
119 See, e.g., Clorox Co. Puerto Rico v. Procter & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24,
39 (1st Cir. 2000) (commenting "[s]tanding alone, ['Whiter is not possible'] might well
constitute an unspecified boast, and hence puffing. In context, however, the statement invites
consumers to compare Ace's whitening power against either other detergents acting alone or
detergents used with chlorine bleach .... [I]t is a specific, measurable claim, and hence not
puffing."); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the claim that advertised defendant's grass seed as "Less is More" was general
and unmeasurable non-actionable puffery; by contrast, the claim that defendant's grass
required "50% Less Mowing" was actionable because it was "a specific and measurable
advertisement claim of product superiority based on product testing.").
120 See, e.g., Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 226, 259 (D.
Conn. 1998) (finding subjective a claim that a product is "perfect" for a specific purpose).
121 See, e.g., Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d at 922 (finding "[m]ere puffing,
advertising 'that is not deceptive for no one would rely on its exaggerated claims,' is not
actionable under § 43(a)" (quoting Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 253 n.23 (D.
Del. 1980)); United States v. An Article... Consisting of 216 Individually Cartoned Bottles,
409 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cir. 1969) (ruling that claims which contain "familiar exaggerations"
may not be prohibited because "virtually everyone can be presumed to be capable of
discounting them as puffery.").
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Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's International, Inc. offers a relevant
example of what U.S. law considers non-actionable puffery. 122 Papa John's
ran a series of comparative advertisements specifically referring to Pizza
Hut and containing the slogan "Better Ingredients. Better Pizza." The Fifth
Circuit determined that the slogan "epitomizes the exaggerated advertising,
blustering, and boasting by a manufacturer upon which no consumer would
reasonably rely" and declared that "it is difficult to think of any product or
any component of any product, to which the term 'better', without more, is
quantifiable., 123 Such a claim would undoubtedly be prohibited by French
courts as general and subjective.
Similarly, it is worth noting that the French objectivity requirement has
the effect of prohibiting the use of "[i]f you like [them], you'll love [us]"
advertisements which are widely used in the United States. In Saxony
Products, Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc., the Ninth Circuit denied injunction against
defendant's use of plaintiff's famous perfume trademark, Shalimar, in the
slogan "[i]f you like Shalimar, you'll love Fragrance S.,,124 The "like/love"
advertising format, which obviously does not concern "relevant, decisive,
verifiable and representative" features of the product and undoubtedly
involves a subjective statement, could be prosecuted on the ground of the
objectivity provisions of Article L. 121-8(3) C. Con.
2. Different Consumer Standards
The above analysis of the French objectivity requirement and U.S.
puffery rules brings to light two different positions regarding consumers'
122 227 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2000).
123 Id. at 498-99. However, the court held that advertisements using the "Better
ingredients. Better pizza" slogan and comparing the ingredients used by Papa John's to those
used by Pizza Hut constituted actionable factually-based claims. The court reasoned:
[Tihe message communicated by the slogan.., is expanded and given additional meaning
when it is used as the tag line in the misleading sauce and dough ads. The slogan, when used
in combination with the comparison ads, gives consumers two fact-specific reasons why
Papa John's ingredients are "better."... In short, Papa John's has given definition to the
word "better."
Id. at 501. Despite the fact that the superiority claims were false, the court dismissed the case
because evidence did not prove that the Papa John's claims were "material," i.e. that
consumers relied on them). Id. at 503-04.
124 513 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Diversified Mktg., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc.,
705 F. Supp 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (refusing to enjoin use of the comparative advertising
slogan "If You Like Estee Lauder. . . You'll Love Beauty USA"). But cf Charles of the Ritz
Group, Ltd. v. Quality King Distrib., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see supra
notes 105-06 and accompanying text. See generally Diane Martens Reed, Comment, Use of
"Like/Love'" Slogans in Advertising: Is the Trademark Owner Protected? 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 101 (1989).
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behavior toward advertising. Although consumer information is the
primary concern of U.S. courts, they make certain assumptions about
consumer credulity. Consumer welfare remains the criterion, or the
relevant policy norm, but their decisions rest on the premise that the
purchasing public is, for the most part, rational, reasonable, and
sophisticated enough not to believe that vague, general, and subjective
statements are literally true. Faced with puffery ads, U.S. consumers are
presumed capable of not taking all advertisements seriously and
understanding their source and limitations.
Hence, the U.S. model consumer to judge deception is the average or
reasonable consumer of the relevant product or service. 125 A 1983 FTC
Policy Statement on Deception ruled that a practice is deceptive if it is
likely to mislead "a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances.' 26
This reasonable consumer standard is also applied by the courts. In Federal
Trade Commission v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp.,127 the Eighth
Circuit held that "[t]o satisfy the reliance requirement in actions brought
under section 13(b) of the Act, the FTC needs merely show that the
misrepresentations or omissions were of a kind usually relied upon by
reasonable and prudent persons .... ,,128 Advertisements are also evaluated
from the perspective of the reasonable consumer under the Lanham Act. 129
Conversely, by requiring the comparison to "objectively compare
relevant, decisive, verifiable and representative features" of the goods or
services, the French legislation seems to implicitly take a different type of
125 It must be pointed out that the credulous consumer was the criterion before the
reasonable consumer became the standard. See, e.g., Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co.,
178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910) (ruling that "the law is... made for the protection of... the
ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous, who, in making purchases do not stop to analyze
but are governed by appearances and general impressions."); Doe v. Boys Clubs, Inc., 907
S.W.2d 472, 479-80 (Tex. 1995) (stating "an act is false, misleading or deceptive [under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act] if it has the capacity to deceive an 'ignorant,
unthinking or credulous person."'). The "reasonable consumer" standard was applied for the
first time in Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) (finding a claim stating that the
advertiser's engine device would enable consumers to save fuel as deceptive).
126 F.T.C. Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 174, appended to Cliffdale Assocs.,
103 F.T.C. 110 (1984), [hereinafter Policy Statement on Deception] available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm (Oct. 14, 1983).
127 931 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1991).
128 Id. at 1316.
129 Ulf Doepner & Frank-Erich Hufiagel, Towards a European Consumer Protection?
Protection Against Misleading Advertising in Europe, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 177, 193 (1998)
(stating "[c]ourts applying the Lanham Act have held that an advertisement may be deemed
misleading if 'a not unsubstantial number of consumers receive a false or misleading
impression from it."') (quoting McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Products Corp., 501 F. Supp.
517, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 501 F. Supp 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
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consumer into account: the "credulous, ignorant and unthinking" one.130
French courts have confirmed the legislature's position by using the least
able consumer approach to judge the legality of advertising claims. Certain
commentators have correctly pointed out that,
[i]nstead of the often-quoted "bon pare de famille"- a highly attentive
consumer who is able to critically evaluate information contained in an
advertisement and to avoid being easily deceived - the new French
practice rather takes the "consommateur moyen" described as "much
more vulnerable and credulous" as a guideline when enforcing the
relevant provisions of the Code de la Consommation.1
3
1
Several elements distinguish the reasonable consumer from the
credulous purchaser. The reasonable consumer is the attentive, mature, and
critical one who does not rely solely on the advertisement. On the contrary,
he "critically perceives the information given, carefully evaluates and
analyzes its content and meaning and finally bases a rational decision on
such analysis."'3 However, he is not a knowledgeable, sophisticated, or
highly-educated consumer 133 and the fact that consumers are not always
capable of understanding all relevant facts is considered when judging
advertising. 134  Additionally, the reasonable consumer exercises common
130 U.S. case law used that language to define the credulous consumer before the
reasonable consumer became the standard. See supra note 125. For examples of French
cases using the "consommateur moyen" as a standard, see, e.g., CA Paris, Sept. 27, 1993, D.
1994 somm. 77, note M.-L. Izorche (stating that a likelihood of confusion exists when the
"consommateur d'attention moyenne" is not able to carry out a technical examination
capable of disclosing the differences between the products which he does not simultaneously
have in front of him"), cited in Pascal Wilhelm, La Concurrence dloyale et parasitaire
applique ii lapublicit6, http://www.p-wilhelm.com/?pidref=32 (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
131 Doepner & Hufnagel, supra note 129, at 192 (quoting CALAIs-AULoY & STEM1METZ,
supra note 13, 117 at 11).
132 Id. at 185.
133 A sophisticated consumer has special knowledge of the type of product advertised.
See, e.g., Sandoz Pharms. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 229-30 (3d Cir.
1990) (commenting "a target audience's special knowledge of a class of products is highly
relevant to any claim that it was misled by an advertisement for such a product."); Plough,
Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co, 532 F. Supp. 714, 717-18 (D. Del. 1982) (stating
"[c]ontext can be important in discerning the message conveyed and this is particularly true
where, as here, the target of the advertising is not the consuming public but a more well
informed and sophisticated audience of merchants."); Policy Statement on Deception, supra
note 126 (commenting "a practice or representation directed to a well-educated group, such
as prescription drug advertisement to doctors, would be judged in the light of the knowledge
and sophistication of that group.").
134 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 557 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1978)
(upholding the FTC's finding that consumers would be deceived by an ad stating that
gasoline additive would reduce pollution by transforming clear exhaust into dark exhaust
because many consumers are not well-informed about the effects of visible and invisible
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sense and does not necessarily believe and rely on all statements contained
in the advertisement. 35 He is the average target consumer. 136 By contrast,
the credulous consumer is a vulnerable, inattentive, uncritical, trusting, non-
discerning, unrealistic, and unsophisticated person. He does not consult
information available about the product before the purchase and only relies
on the advertisement. In short, he attaches significance to any vague and
general claim and is incapable of understanding the ad as a mere statement
of opinion.
The U.S. reasonable consumer approach is more convincing.
Consistent with the objectives of free competition and consumer welfare,
the reasonable person approach allows use of comparative advertising
within broad limits, while ensuring protection and information of the
buying public as a whole (since puffery claims are those upon which
reasonable consumers are not likely to rely). The Seventh Circuit has
clearly explained why going further than the reasonable consumer standard
would lessen consumer welfare. "Many consumers are ignorant or
inattentive, so some are bound to misunderstand no matter how careful a
producer is. If such a possibility [of confusion] created a trademark
problem, then all comparative references would be forbidden, and
consumers as a whole would be worse off.'
13 7
Conversely, the credulous consumer standard or, more generally, the
objectivity requirement, is a considerable obstacle to the development of
comparative advertising in France. It has the effect of prohibiting a large
number of comparative advertisements that are allowed by U.S. standards,
such as general claims of superiority, "like/love" ads, or statements
comparing the taste or smell of products. In practice, companies
contemplating comparative advertising campaigns in France are deterred
components of exhaust on air pollution and would falsely believe that the gasoline additive
would significantly decrease pollution).
135 See, e.g., Marcus Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that when a telephone company's slogan claims that using its services would enable
consumers to amass "true savings," the consumer who did not accumulate "true savings"
cannot be granted remedy).
136 See, e.g., Grolier, 91 F.T.C. 315, 430 (1978) (stating "[i]n determining the meaning of
an advertisement ... the important criterion is the net impression that it is likely to make on
the general populace."), remanded on other grounds, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980),
modified on other grounds, 98 F.T.C. 882 (1981), reissued, 99 F.T.C. 379 (1982); Policy
Statement on Deception, supra note 126, § III (declaring that the FTC examines
"expectations and understandings of the typical buyer").
137 August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation
omitted); see also Doepner & Hufnagel, supra note 129, at 186 (stating "consumer
protection would be undermined if strict advertising laws effectively prevented the
dissemination of information which, though potentially misunderstood by a minority of the
consumers addressed, enhanced the transparency of the market for the vast majority of the
public.").
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from using this advertising format. They have to be extremely cautious
when using comparative ads in order to avoid having the advertising
campaign in which they have expended great efforts, skills, and money,
prohibited by the courts. To this extent, the objectivity requirement acts as
a brake on the use of comparative advertising. Ultimately, this limits the
information that may be communicated to the consuming public.
B. Comparative Advertising Dealing with the Value of Another's
Trademark
38
By contrast with the United States, and resting upon a different
conception of property ownership, France expressly prohibits not only
comparative advertisements exploiting the value of a rival's trademark, but
also those attacking that trademark.
1. Comparative Advertising Exploiting the Value of a Trademark
The French prohibition of comparative advertising exploiting the value
of a trademark finds expression in two sets of provisions which both restate
case law developed over many years. First, Article L.121-9(l) C. Con.
states that a comparative claim "may not take unfair advantage of the
reputation of a trademark ... of a competitor .... ,139 Second, under
Article L.121-9(4) C. Con. the advertisement "may not present goods or
services as an imitation or replica of goods or services bearing a protected
trademark ... ,140 These provisions encompass seemingly similar types of
advertisements. However, while Article L. 121-9(1) may be used as a
ground to prohibit any comparison capitalizing on the reputation of a
trademark, Article L. 121-9(4) specifically prevents comparisons of the
following type: "Product X is a copy of and has the same quality as product
Y but is half the price of the original."
French courts have prohibited such claims for some time. For
example, advertisements presenting the advertised product as being of the
same "type" or "kind" as the competitor's trademark are unlawful.'1 The
advertiser is regarded as capitalizing on the trademark owner's goodwill
and improperly benefiting from his reputation. Thus, the Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Bourges prohibited an advertisement for "style
138 Although the analysis conducted in this article may also apply to trade names and any
other distinguishing signs, it will focus on trademarks as they are the trade symbols most
frequently involved in comparative advertising cases.
139 C. CON., at art. L.121-9(l), supra note 71.
140 Id. at art. L.121-9(4).
141 This form of comparative advertisements is also declared unlawful by L.713-2 IPC,
which prohibits the "reproduction, use or affixing of a mark even with the addition of words
such as formula, style, system, imitation, type or method." See, e.g., CA Versailles, Jan. 19,
1987, D. 1993 somm. 113.
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Barbour" hunting clothes, on the grounds that the advertiser was wrongfully
taking advantage of the "Barbour" trademark owner's reputation. 1
42
Particularly interesting is the prohibition of the so-called tableaux de
concordance. This practice, commonly referred to as "knock-off' in the
United States, is frequently used in the perfume industry and is prohibited
in France for infringing on the competitor's trademark. The tableaux de
concordance practice can be described as follows: perfume manufacturers
lawfully create perfumes very similar to others' famous perfumes. Then,
they advertise their perfumes as being equivalent to, but cheaper than, the
famous perfumes. Courts do not prohibit the manufacture of perfumes
similar to other perfumes. 143 They only prohibit the advertisement of these
perfumes as similar to the famous ones. One hundred and thirty eight court
decisions prohibited such advertisements between 1981 and 1991.144
According to French scholars, several reasons justify the prohibition of the
tableaux de concordance. First, the advertiser would unfairly capture the
trademark holder's potential customers. Second, the trademark's fame
would be tarnished. Finally, the use of another's trademark in tableaux de
concordance would create a serious threat to the distinctiveness of the
trademark and would raise the risk of making the words of which the mark
is composed into a generic term.
145
The French prohibition of comparisons exploiting the value of a
trademark contrasts with the U.S. dilution-by-blurring theory which
expressly exempts comparative advertising. Blurring, which is the
"traditional" or "classic" form of dilution, 46 occurs "when use of a mark by
others generates awareness that the mark no longer signifies anything
unique, singular or particular, but instead may (or does) denominate several
varying items from varying sources."' 14 7 The blurring theory is embodied in
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. 48  Most state statutes also contain
142 T.G.I. Bourges, June 15, 1995, P.I.B.D. 1995, III, 595, 432; see also, e.g., CA Paris,
Sept. 19, 1997, Gaz. Pal. 1998, 1, somm. 372.
143 See, e.g., Cass. com., July 8, 2003, 11 CONTRATS, CoNC., CoNsoM. 29 (2003) (holding
that does not constitute an unfair business practice the fact of copying the product of
another).
144 See, e.g., Cass. com., Oct. 16, 1985, 1985 Bull. Civ. IV, No. 243; Cass. com., Jan. 27,
1981, Ann. Prop. Ind. 1981,91.
145 Christine-Maud Vilmart, La reference 6 la marque d'autrui sera-t-elle encore
sanctionnge en dehors de la contrefaqon? Le cas de la parfumerie, Gaz. Pal. 1991, doctr. 8.
146 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:68.
147 Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-
Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 308 (1984).
148 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2003). Section 1125(c) provides: "(1) The owner of a
famous mark shall be entitled.., to an injunction against another person's commercial use
in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous
and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark ...." Section 1127 defines dilution
as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
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dilution-by-blurring provisions. 149 Typically, use of a competitor's mark in
advertising is blurring when the consumer, although he knows that the
competitor did not produce the advertised good, mentally associates the
competitor's mark with the advertiser's products upon viewing the
competitor's mark in the context of the comparative advertisement. Since,
in the future, the consumer will think not only of the competitor's products
but also of the advertiser's goods upon viewing the competitor's mark, the
mark's distinctiveness has been blurred.
At first blush, the blurring theory seems to endanger comparative
advertising. Positive comparative advertising which is usually "used to
participate in the good reputation of a competitor's [mark]"' 50 and,
therefore, often creates an association in the public's mind between the
advertiser's products and his rival's marks is particularly threatened.
Strictly applied, the blurring theory would provide competitors with a
powerful weapon to prevent most of their rival's equivalence and positive
comparative claims. For that reason, comparative advertising may be
invoked as a defense in dilution cases. Section 43(c)(4)(A) of the Lanham
Act states that "[flair use of a famous mark by another person in
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark" shall not be actionable
under the dilution section of the Act. 151 The above provisions only exempt
"fair" use of another's mark in comparative advertising. For example, non-
trademark use of one's competitor's mark (i.e., use of the mark in a
descriptive sense for the sole purpose of identifying the competitor's
product) is considered "nominative fair use."'1 52  This descriptive use
services, regardless of the presence or absence of - (1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."
149 States started to adopt dilution statutes in the 1940's. For an example of state anti-
dilution law, see, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 2003) (declaring
"[1]ikelihood... of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a
ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered or not registered or
in cases of unfair competition... ").
150 Bodewig, supra note 8, at 184.
151 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A) (2003). It must be noted that courts consider that state
dilution laws should be analyzed and construed as the Federal Dilution Act. See 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:79 (quoting Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d
868, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801, 1806 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating "[w]e have interpreted [the
California Bus & Prof Code] § 14330, like the Federal Dilution Act, to protect only famous
marks."); Network Network v. CBS, Inc., 2000 WL 362016 at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding
"[d]ilution under state law is subject to essentially the same analysis as dilution under the
FTDA."); see generally Nancy S. Griewe, Antidilution Statutes: A New Attack on
Comparative Advertising, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 178 (1982) (exploring the relationship
between state anti-dilution statutes and comparative advertising).
152 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating "[a]
nominative use, by definition, refers to the trademark holder's product. It does not create an
improper association in consumers' minds between a new product and the trademark
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limitation to the dilution theory allows comparative advertising to be
exempted from blurring violation to a large extent. U.S. courts, whether
they deal with federal or state law, tend to authorize comparative
advertising where the risk of blurring is minimized. In Deere & Co. v.
MTD Products, Inc., 153 the Second Circuit had to address the issue, arising
under the New York anti-dilution statute, of "whether an advertiser may
depict an altered form of a competitor's trademark to identify the
competitor's product in a comparative ad.', 154 The court, after declaring that
"[s]ellers of commercial products may wish to use a competitor's mark to
identify the competitor's product in comparative advertisements," ruled that
the plaintiffs distinctiveness of the mark was not likely to be blurred since
its use by defendant posed "slight if any risk of impairing the identification
of Deere's mark with its products.",55 The advertisement was nonetheless
enjoined on the ground of tamishment.1
56
More specifically, the French prohibition of comparisons presenting
goods as copies of products bearing a trademark set out in Article L. 121-
9(4) C. Con. is contrary to what might be called the U.S. "right of informing
rule." Under U.S. law, "if a seller has the right to copy public domain
features of his competitor's goods, then, as a corollary, he must have the
right to inform the public of this fact.' 57 The principle is that the one who
legally copied a competitor's product can truthfully tell the purchasing
public of the similarities between his product and the original. The rule
rests on the proposition that prohibiting use of a competitor's trademark for
the sole purpose of identifying the competitor's product would have the
effect of "extend[ing] the monopoly of the trademark to a monopoly of the
product.' ' 5 8 As early as 1910, in Saxlehner v. Wagner, the Supreme Court
declared that a seller of mineral water had the right to refer to a
competitor's trademark to identify the competitor's product and truthfully
inform consumers of the close identity between the water he was selling
and that of the competitor. 5 9 The rule has been followed since that 1910
holder's mark.").
' 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
114 Id. at 40.
"' Id. at 44.
156 See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
157 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 25:52.
158 See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968).
159 216 U.S. 375 (1910). The court explained:
The real intent of the plaintiff's bill, it seems to us, is to extend the monopoly of such
trademark or trade name as she may have to a monopoly of her type of bitter water, by
preventing manufacturers from telling the public in a way that will be understood, what they
are copying and trying to sell. But the plaintiff has no patent for the water, and the defendants
have a right to reproduce it as nearly as they can. They have a right to tell the public what
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mineral water case. In the Dior case, 160 the Second Circuit declared:
The Lanham Act does not prohibit a commercial rival's truthfully
denominating his goods a copy of a design in the public domain, though
he uses the name of the designer to do so. Indeed it is difficult to see
any other means that might be employed to inform the consuming public
of the true origin of the design.
16 1
Similarly, in Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Laboratories,
Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that use of the trademark "Obsession" in. a
claim for a perfume advertised as "our version of Obsession" was lawful.'
62
The court explained that "the underlying rationale is that an imitator is
entitled to truthfully inform the public that it has produced a product
equivalent to the original and that the public may benefit through lower
prices by buying the imitation."' 63 Thus, using a competitor's trademark to
they are doing, and to get whatever share they can in the popularity of the water by
advertising that they are trying to make the same article, and think that they succeed. If they
do not convey, but, on the contrary, exclude, the notion that they are selling the plaintiff's
goods, it is a strong proposition that when the article has a well-known name they have not
the right to explain by that name what they imitate. By doing so, they are not trying to get the
good will of the name, but the good will of the goods.
Id. at 380-81 (citations omitted).
160 Socidtd Comptoir de L'Industrie Cotonnirre, Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's
Dep't Stores, 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
161 Id. at 36. The Chanel court similarly stated:
Assuming the equivalence of "Second Chance" and "Chanel No. 5," the public interest
would not be served by a rule of law which would preclude sellers of "Second Chance" from
advising consumers of the equivalence and thus effectively deprive consumers of knowledge
that an identical product was being offered at one third the price.
By taking his "free ride," the copyist, albeit unintentionally, serves an important public
interest by offering comparable goods at lower prices.
Chanel, 402 F.2d at 568. The Chanel case is often cited as an authoritative decision. See,
e.g., Sykes Lab., Inc., v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1985), declaring:
One consequence of the rule announced in Smith v. Chanel is that the copyist may freely
capitalize on the goodwill and product recognition developed at great cost by the trademark
owner.
If they have taken a "free ride" on plaintiffs name without causing confusion or deception,
then they have taken that to which they were legally entitled.
Id. at 854-55.
162 815 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1987).
1I3 ld. at 504.
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truthfully inform consumers of the advertiser's cheaper versions of famous
trademarked goods would be an act of unfair competition under French law,
but would certainly be legal under U.S. advertising law.
2. Comparative Advertising Attacking the Value of a Trademark
Turning to the issue of disparagement, it is worth recalling that in
France, prior to 1992, comparative advertising was considered IVynonymous
with disparagement and usually prohibited as such by courts.' The 1992
Act did not contain any express or specific provision on disparagement but
only generally required the advertised comparisons to be "fair." Many
comparisons were prohibited as disparaging the competitor's mark on the
ground of this fairness requirement. Competitors also attacked comparisons
criticizing their marks, products, or services using the unfair competition
notion, which appeared to be a very powerful weapon in this regard.
1 65
Today, Article L.121-9(2) C. Con. is more explicit than the 1992 Act, as it
provides that the comparison cannot "discredit or denigrate trademarks...
of a competitor."'166  Judicial precedents are particularly relevant in
interpreting this provision. An analysis of the precedents shows that the
distinction between reprehensible disparagement and authorized criticism is
a fuzzy one. Surprisingly, disparagement is often found even in the absence
of either a false or a misleading statement about the competitor's mark or
desire to damage his reputation. 67  It seems that where the critical
comparison relates to facts that are proved accurate, it should be accepted.
But French courts take a different stand. For example, a merchant cannot
164 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
166 Article L.121-9(2) of C. CON. also prohibits comparisons discrediting or denigrating a
competitor's products or services. Although the analysis of article L.121-9(2) focuses on
comparative claims disparaging a competitor's trademark, it is worth mentioning that,
contrary to French law, U.S. law requires falsity in product disparagement cases. Under U.S.
law, product disparagement occurs when "when one publishes, with the requisite state of
mind, a false statement of fact disparaging another's goods or services which is proven to
have caused a specific loss of sales." 4 McCARTHY, supra note 14, § 27:91. The elements of
the tort of product disparagement usually are:
(1) a falsehood; (2) published, or communicated to a third person; (3) when the defendant-
publisher knows or reasonably should know that it will likely result in inducing others not to
deal with the plaintiff; (4) the falsehood does play a material and substantial part in inducing
others not to deal with the plaintiff; (5) special damages are proximately caused as a result of
the published falsehood.
Harrison, supra note 2, at 233-34. Consequently, product disparagement falls under the
rubric of false advertising.
167 Noel-Frangois Alpi, Action en Concurrence D6Ioyale. Elements de Procedure, Juris-
classeur Concurrence-Consommation,fascicule 245, 47 (2003).
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display in his store a court decision passed against his rival. 168 Likewise, a
coffee manufacturer may not criticize the manufacturing process of a
competitor, regardless of whether that critic has sufficient grounds to do
so."' In addition, disparagement not only occurs when the advertiser
expressly criticizes his competitor, but also where, for example, he
reproduces certain elements of his competitor's recent advertisement such
as an animated robot. 170 Hence, French courts have a strong tendency to
resort to disparagement to prohibit critical comparisons in advertising: "if
the exaggeration which is inherent in any advertisement does not in itself
break the rules of fair competition, the [superiority claim] cannot be
allowed where the [statement of superiority] ends up.. .depriving
competitors of the same qualities."' 7 1 As a result, advertisers contemplating
comparative campaigns in France should avoid criticizing their competitors
in order to maximize their chances of saving their advertisements from
illegality.
The French disparagement theory must be compared to the U.S.
trademark disparagement theory, more commonly referred to as
"tarnishment," which is another form of dilution. Typically, tarnishment
occurs where an unauthorized use of a trademark injures the owner's
business reputation.1 72 As the Second Circuit stated,
"[t]arnishment" generally arises when the plaintiffs trademark is linked
to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or
unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner's
product. In such situations, the trademark's reputation and commercial
value might be diminished because the public will associate the lack of
quality or lack of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiff's
unrelated goods, or because the defendant's use reduces the trademark's
reputation and standing in the eyes of consumers as a wholesome
identifier of the owner's products or services.
173
168 Cass. com., Mar. 2, 1982, cited in Biolay supra note 45, 49.
169 CA Paris, Mar. 27, 1977, cited in Biolay, supra note 45, 49.
170 CA Paris, Feb. 12, 1988, D. 1988 inf. rap., 75. See Biolay, supra note 45, 45, 47.
171 CA Douai, Oct. 2, 1995, D. 1996, 99, note Fourgoux; 9 LEGICOM 52 (1995). But cf
CA Paris, Jan. 18, 2002, Gaz. Pal. 2002, II, jur. 1668 (holding that it was not disparaging for
a radio station to display two soda cans of different sizes, the big one bearing the logo of the
advertiser (NRJ) and the small one the logo of one competitor (Europe 1) accompanied by a
slogan of the type: "NRJ has 30% listeners more than Europe 1.").
172 Tamishment has its roots in the 1964 USTA (now the International Trademark
Association or INTA) Model Bill which used the language "likelihood of injury to business
reputation." Today, most anti-dilution state statutes use that same language. See Robert S.
Nelson, Unraveling the Trademark Rope: Tarnishment and Its Proper Place in the Laws of
Unfair Competition, 42 IDEA 133, 146 (2002).
173 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
Comparative Advertising in the United States and France
25:371 (2005)
In contrast with blurring, which only dilutes the distinctive value of the
mark, tarnishment also degrades its positive associational value. In other
words, "[t]he sine qua non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiffs mark
will suffer negative associations through defendant's use."' 174 It must be
noted that the federal anti-dilution statute does not expressly refer to
tarnishment and a discussion exists as to whether it encompasses dilution by
tamishment. 175 In any event, U.S. courts dealing with federal law expressly
recognize and apply that theory. Most states also clearly and
unambiguously consider tarnishment as a form of dilution.1
76
Tarnishment, which was originally limited to "unsavory" or
"unwholesome" uses of a trademark, such as those associating the mark
with sexual, obscene, or illegal activities, has been expanded by courts to
encompass all "unflattering" uses. 177  In Deere, the Second Circuit
addressed a commercial that used "a static image of a graceful, full-size
deer-symbolizing [plaintiffs] substance and strength-and portray[ed], in
an animated version, a deer that appear[ed] smaller than a small dog and
scamper[ed] away from the dog and a lawn tractor, looking over its
shoulder in apparent fear."' 7 Although it observed the Deere mark was not
used in connection with sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal activity, the
court prohibited the ad as damaging the mark by "alteration[] "1""
accomplished for the sole purpose of promoting a competing product... 79
The court has declared that "[s]ellers of commercial products who wish to
attract attention to their commercials or products and thereby increase sales
by poking fun at widely recognized marks... risk diluting the selling
174 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 508 (2d Cir. 1996).
175 The Federal Dilution Act does not expressly use the terms "tamishment" and
"likelihood of injury to business reputation." See supra note 151. Certain commentators have
asserted that legislative history makes it clear that Congress did not intend to exclude
tamishment from the Federal Dilution Act. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 24:95;
Nelson, supra note 172, at 150. However, in Moseley v. Victoria Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
U.S. 418, 432 (2003), the Supreme Court cast doubt on this. It held that "the contrast
between the state statutes, which expressly refer to both 'injury to business reputation' and to
'dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trademark,' and the federal statute
which refers only to the latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the FTDA." It must
be noted that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition encompasses dilution by
tarnishment. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1995).
176 See Nelson, supra note 172, at 145-46 (2002).
177 See id. at 171.
178 Deere, 41 F.3d at 45.
179 Id. at 45. After observing that the advertisement constituted neither blurring nor
tarnishment, the court declared that "the blurring/tamishment dichotomy does not
necessarily represent the full range of uses that can dilute a mark .... Id. at 44. The
alteration form of dilution created by the Deere court has later been construed as "a broad
view of tamishment" rather than as "a new category of dilution." See Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d
at 507.
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power of the mark that is made fun of." 180
A parallel may be established between the Deere case and a very
recent Cour d'appel de Paris case involving a television commercial for
Orangina, a sugar-free soda. The commercial presented a group of people
dressed up as sugar lumps (the "sugar" character) who were refused
entrance to a nightclub, while a tall and slender person wearing an orange
outfit (the "Orangina" character) could easily get in. The court found the
sugar character was presented in a ridiculous light because of its cramped
look, begging attitude, and eventual failure to get in. This tarnished the
image of the sugar product without adding anything to the strength of the
Orangina message. The commercial was, therefore, held to be disparaging
toward the sugar product.
181
Just as blurring threatened positive and equivalence claims,
tarnishment is a potentially important restriction to negative and superiority
comparative claims. "Interpreted literally, [it] could easilyr be used to
prevent many forms of parody in comparative advertising." 82  However,
both U.S. courts and the Federal Dilution Act have limited application of
the tarnishment theory when it comes to comparative advertising. As
mentioned above, section 43(c)(4)(A) of the Lanham Act exempts fair
comparative advertising from dilution violation. In addition, the Deere
court itself has expressly established limits to the tarnishment form of
dilution in the area of comparative advertising, deciding that use of a
trademark in comparative ads may be authorized as long as the trademark is
not significantly altered. 83  Tarnishment would only occur where
alterations of a mark "are made by a competitor with both an incentive to
diminish the favorable attributes of the mark and an ample opportunity to
promote its products in ways that make no significant alteration."'8  A
good illustration of U.S. courts' willingness to limit application of the
tarnishment theory where comparative claims are involved is provided by
case law considering lawful use of a competitor's mark to advertise knock-
off products.185
Although they have developed a similar theory to protect competitors
180 Deere, 41 F.3d at 44.
181 Lionel Forest, Publicit: l'humour n 'excuse pas tout, LES ECHOS, Sept. 1, 2004, 12.
182 Nelson, supra note 172, at 171.
183 The Second Circuit held that when a mark is used "to identify a competing product in
an informative comparative ad ... the scope of the protection under a dilution statute must
take into account the degree to which the mark is altered and the nature of the alteration."
Deere, 41 F.3d at 45. See also Girl Scouts of U.S.A. v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F.
Supp. 1228, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that a poster depicting a pregnant girl scout,
thereby conveying the idea that the traditional image of girl scouts as chaste must be
challenged, did not injure the Girl Scouts' trademark).
184 Deere, 41 F.3d at 45 (emphasis added).
185 See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
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against unscrupulous advertisers, U.S. and French laws do not handle the
theory the same way when it comes to comparative advertising. French law
extensively uses the disparagement notion to prohibit a wide range of
critical comparisons. By contrast, the U.S. approach is much more
moderate, as it takes into account the degree of the harm to the competitor
and the advertiser's incentive to injure his rival's goodwill in order to
decide whether the criticism should be prohibited.
3. Different Conceptions of Property Rights in Trademarks
Trademark rights have a "less tangible quality"'18 6 in the United States
than in France. This may explain the existence of different regimes as
discussed in subsections (1) and (2) above. French law places great
importance on protecting the trademark owner's reputation and goodwill,
the idea being that by investing intellectual and financial resources in the
trademark itself, the owner is building "a symbol of his reputation"'' 87 and
creating "the selling power of his trademark." 188 The owner ascribes to the
product an attractive image that will appeal to consumers. Enterprises
spend great amounts of money, effort, skill, and ability to develop their
marks and to get the purchasing public to recognize them. The outcome
may be that products are sold regardless of such characteristics as quality or
price, because the reputation of the mark they bear is sufficient alone to
induce customers to buy them. These reasons have led French academic
researchers, courts, and legislative authorities to conclude that the function
of a trademark is not only to distinguish between different origins, but also
to embody the owner's reputation and goodwill that become the
"protectible feature[s] of [the] trademark[]." "9 The Court of Justice of the
European Communities has also expressly recognized that "in relation to
trademarks, the specific subject-matter of the industrial property is intended
to protect [the trademark owner] against competitors wishing to take
advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark .... ,,190
U.S. law also accords weight to the owner's investment in his mark
within the particular use of the blurring and tarnishment theories, but the
policy goal of freedom of competition and consumer welfare prevails
insofar as comparative advertising is concerned. Representative of this idea
is the language used by Judge Browning in the "right of informing" Chanel
case:191 Judge Browning first explained that the anticompetitive
186 Comparative Advertising, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 351, 351 (1977).
187 ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 189 (3d ed. 2000).
188 Griewe, supra note 151, at 179.
189 MILLER& DAVIS, supra note 187, at 191.
190 Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183 (1974).
191 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
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consequences of the protection of the trademark owner's reputation and
goodwill "have little compensating benefits."'' 92  The appeal of highly
advertised trademarks, although it protects firms already on the market,
constitutes a barrier to the entry of newcomers into the marketplace. In
turn, high barriers to entry tend to "produce 'high excess profits and
monopolistic output restriction' and 'probably.. .high and possibly
excessive costs of sales promotion."",193 Judge Browning then rebutted
appellees' argument that when great resources have been invested to
develop the trademark's "selling power"'194 the competitor should be
prohibited from free riding on the reputation and goodwill embodied in that
trademark. 95 He ruled that a "large expenditure of money does not in itself
create legally protectable rights. Appellees are not entitled to monopolize
the public's desire for the unpatented product, even though they themselves
created that desire at great effort and expense.'
196
A closely related concern explains why U.S. dilution law explicitly
exempts comparative advertising: consumers may not be deprived of
valuable and accurate information about either the similarities of
comparable products or the defects of certain goods available on the market
under the pretence of protecting the trademark's selling power. As one
commentator stated, "[i]nformative comparative advertising conveys useful
information, and furthers the public interest in well-informed consumer
decisions and wiser allocation of resources .... This form of comparative
advertising cannot be suppressed under antidilution regulation."'
197
The French position seems unconvincing. Although the trademark
owners' substantial investment in their marks has to be protected in
principle, when it comes to comparative advertising, the anticompetitive
consequences of such protection' could outweigh its beneficial effects.
Indeed, the only purpose for preserving trademark values, other than the
source identification function, is to protect the investment of the trademark
owner who, therefore, is the one and only party benefiting from such
expanded trademark protection. The weight accorded to those trademark
values is, therefore, surprising since the traditional concern of protecting the
competitor welfare, i.e., the trademark owner's, has now been officially
replaced by the policy goals of maximization of competition and consumer
welfare. 199 In fact, the French position confuses unfair competition with
192 Id. at 566.
193 Id. at 566-67 (quoting J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 114-15 (1955)).
194 Griewe, supra note 151, at 179.
195 Smith, 402 F.2d at 568.
196 id.
197 See Griewe, supra note 151, at 202-03.
198 See supra note 192-93 and accompanying text.
199 See supra Part II.1.1.b.
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free competition. Authorizing advertisers to criticize or exploit the value of
others' trademarks in comparative advertising certainly makes competition
vigorous (i.e., free) but not necessarily deceptive (i.e., unfair). There is no
clash between comparative advertising and fair competition as long as false
and confusing claims are prohibited.2°° However, under the pretence of
preserving fair competition in the marketplace, the provisions of Articles
L.121-9(1), L.121-9(2) and L.121-9(4) adversely affect free competition
and consumer welfare.
Particularly subject to criticism is the prohibition of comparative
advertising that takes advantage of the reputation of a trademark. In most
comparative ads, and specifically in equivalence claims, the primary
purpose of the comparison itself is to benefit from the reputation and
goodwill that the competitor has developed in his mark. Prohibiting claims
that take advantage of the reputation of the rival's trademark is therefore
giving competitors a powerful device to sue any advertiser citing their
mark. In particular, owners of famous trademarks may easily convince
courts that the ad aims at capitalizing on their goodwill. Such a provision
seems all the more useless since French courts have a great propensity to
broaden the protection granted in the unfair competition area in order to
prohibit any reprehensible behavior, including behavior infringing
trademark owners' reputation and goodwill. 20 1 As a result, by prohibiting
comparative advertisements from taking advantage of the reputation of a
competitor's trademark, Article L.121-9(1) C. Con. is not only encouraging
competitors to sue the advertiser, but also leading courts to prohibit
comparative advertising to a large extent. Such a provision can be analyzed
as a de facto prohibition of comparative claims involving famous
trademarks.
Similar criticism can be brought against the provision inserted into the
French Consumer code by the 2001 Decree, making it unlawful to
disparage a competitor's mark. It provides French judges with another
weapon, in addition to the unfair competition laws, to prohibit competitors'
criticisms in advertising. This may encourage courts to prevent such claims
even more than they already do. The possible drifting off of the new anti-
disparagement provision is therefore obvious: combined with the courts'
tendency to broadly apply the unfair competition notion to bar critical
comparisons, it may lead them to enjoin any superiority and negative claim.
Yet, consumers have a strong interest in being informed of the defects of
certain products and of the superior properties of others. The U.S. approach
is, therefore, more persuasive. While concerned with granting the
trademark owners' investments a certain protection against exaggerated,
200 See generally 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 31:90 (analyzing the consistency
between "free" competition and "fair" competition).
201 Andrieu, supra note 64, at 136.
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unsubstantiated, or malicious criticisms, it protects reasonable and
temperate criticisms made for informational purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, the U.S. comparative advertising legal regime is less
restrictive and does a better job than the French one in preserving the policy
objectives of consumer welfare and free competition. Although both
countries authorize truthful and non-confusing comparative advertising,
French law places additional heavy restrictions on the use of this marketing
tool. Yet, the prohibition of false and confusing claims seems sufficient to
prevent abuses.
This contrast results from different consumer standards and trademark
values in each country. The great weight accorded to trademark values
other than the source identification function and the use of the credulous
consumer standard under French law undoubtedly favor the interest of the
individual competitor advertised against to the detriment of competition in
the marketplace. This is rather surprising, given that competitors facing
comparative advertisements are far from being defenseless, as they usually
are the ones with the strongest market positions. In practice, they have the
incentives and necessary resources to retaliate with their own advertising
campaigns and answer their rival's comparative claim. 20 2 Therefore, the
negative consequences of the "over-protection" of competitors referred to in
comparative advertisements, namely the impairments to consumer welfare
and free competition, outweigh its benefits-the established competitor
welfare. The rigidity of the French regime is also questionable in that it
generally deters advertisers from using any kind of comparative
advertisement, especially since competitors rarely miss the opportunity to
bring suit against rivals to stop or prevent the relevant advertising
campaign. Moreover, an efficient comparative advertising legal regime
could play a small, yet positive, role in spurring consumer consumption in
order to drive the economic recovery of France and other European Union
Member States.
Some may justify the contrast between the two regimes by suggesting
that French and U.S. consumers have different expectations from
advertising. Certain commentators have explained that contrary to the U.S.
public, French consumers do not have rational expectations in the area of
commercial communication and prefer entertaining, rather than informative,
advertising. Comparative advertising would, therefore, not be an effective
marketing tool in France because of its informational style.20 3 However,
202 See Goldman, supra note 18, at 507.
203 Christian Dianoux & Jean-Luc Heerman, Comparative Advertising in Europe: State of
the Art and Perspectives, available at http://www.escp-eap.net/conferences/marketing/
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this argument is irrelevant in the discussion over the conditions of legality
of comparative advertising. Only companies and advertisers can best
decide whether comparative advertising is the best means of praising their
products; the legislator should always allow them the possibility of using
such a device.
Is a reconciliation of the U.S. and French comparative advertising
legal regimes conceivable in spite of the existing outstanding differences?
At first glance, given the natural tendency that French judges have had for
many years to limit the use of this marketing format, it seems that the two
regimes will continue to be governed by very different rules in the coming
decades. However, it must be borne in mind that the French regime now
results from the implementation of the 1997 European Directive. The Court
of Justice of the European Communities will certainly play an important
role in determining of the boundaries of comparative advertising over the
next few years since national judges, in order to ascertain compliance of
their national legislation with the Community law, will ask for clarification
on certain aspects of the 1997 European Directive. So far the Court of
Justice's decisions have been encouraging, from the comparative
advertisers' standpoint.2°  It is, therefore, hoped that French judges will
follow this trend and remove the legal obstacles which stand in the way of
comparative advertising so as to reconcile French and U.S. law of
pdf/dianoux.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
204 See Case C-44/01, Pippig Augenoptik GmbH & Co KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 2003 E.C.R 1-03095:
[Provisions of the 1997 European Directive] preclude the application to comparative
advertising of stricter national provisions on protection against misleading advertising as far
as the form and content of the comparison is concerned, without there being any need to
establish distinctions between the various elements of the comparison, that is to say
statements concerning the advertiser's offer, statements concerning the competitor's offer
and the relationship between those offers.
[Provisions of the 1997 European Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that... the
advertiser is in principle free to state or not to state the brand name of rival products in
comparative advertising...
[Provisions of the 1997 European Directive] do not preclude compared products from being
bought through different distribution channels.
[C]omparing rival offers, particularly as regards price, is of the very nature of comparative
advertising. Therefore, comparing prices cannot in itself entail the discrediting or denigration
of a competitor who charges higher prices...
[Provisions of the 1997 European Directive] do not prevent comparative advertising, in
addition to citing the competitor's name, from reproducing its logo and a picture of its shop
front, if that advertising complies with the conditions for lawfulness laid down by
Community law.
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